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Introduction: Spirit of the 1917 Revolution
“During the first two months of 1917 Russia was still a Romanov monarchy. Eight
months later the Bolsheviks stood at the helm…You will not find another such sharp turn
in history.”Lev Trotsky,1

By 1917 Russia had been at war for nearly two-and-a-half years. World War I, the
most destructive conflict in human history up to that point, was a modern war where
industry and technology were crucial to success on the battlefield, and few countries were
as ill prepared to fight such a war as Imperial Russia. In 1914 Russia was one of the most
backwards countries in Europe. Its industrialization over recent decades had not been
rapid enough to compensate for a centuries-old legacy of poverty and destitution. The
journalist and historian William Chamberlin described Russia’s disadvantage as follows:
“From the very beginning of hostilities the inferiority of the Russian military machine to
the German in everything but sheer numbers was evident… At the outset Russia had sixty
batteries of artillery against Germany’s three hundred and eighty-one. Russia had one
kilometer of railroad mileage to every hundred square kilometers of territory, as against
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Germany’s 10.6.”2 Russia’s lack of development was a serious detriment to its
capabilities on the battlefield.
During the war Imperial Russia mobilized over fifteen million men to fight. Such
a large muster necessarily brought to the fore all of Russia’s many social ills. Serfdom
had been abolished in 1861, but private agriculture had failed to develop in depth; large
portions of the peasantry lived in similar conditions to those of their ancestors hundreds
of years earlier. Urban workers lived in the basest of conditions. Russia’s nascent
proletariat was rarely more than a generation or two removed from the countryside. From
the workers’ perspective a small handful of well-connected aristocrats, cunning
merchants, and shrewd industrialists lived in vulgar opulence. Naturally it was the
peasants and the workers who bore the brunt of wartime sacrifice. The horrific conflict
gave millions of common Russians a shared point of reference for their suffering, and it
intensified social tensions. As Russia suffered defeat after defeat on the battlefield,
popular unrest against the country’s absolute monarchy escalated.
In February 1917 the masses had had enough. Strikes in Petrograd on 22-23
February 1917 (New-Style: 7-8 March) quickly boiled over into a full-scale insurrection.
When soldiers from the local garrison joined the protesters, the tsar’s time was up. On 2
March (New-Style: 15 March) Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate his throne: the
three-hundred-year rule of the Romanov dynasty, as well as absolute monarchy itself,
came to an end. The men and women who had taken to the streets to press for the tsar’s
ouster were animated by at times conflicting demands: democracy, land reform, peace,
and socialist economic policies were all popular objectives. Some protesters had called
2
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for power to pass to the soviets, elected bodies largely composed of the more radical
representatives of Russia’s socialist parties, but governance was instead entrusted to a
moderate provisional government. Throughout the summer and early fall of 1917
conflicts between the soviets and the provisional government multiplied. The war
continued to devastate Russian society and the economy fell into virtual collapse. A
restive peasantry demanded comprehensive land reform, while the government vacillated.
As conditions deteriorated, so did the population’s faith in the political course of
the provisional government. Calls for the soviets to seize power proliferated; within the
soviets themselves the far-left Bolshevik Party grew increasingly powerful. Trotsky
explained the Bolsheviks’ assessment of the situation: “The revolutionary tendencies of
the masses, even at the moment of the February revolution, did not at all coincide with
the compromise tendencies of the petty bourgeois parties. The proletariat and the
peasantry voted for the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries not as compromisers,
but as opponents of the czar, the capitalists and the landowners. But in voting for them
they created a partition-wall between themselves and their own aims.”3 The Bolsheviks
sought to knock over that wall. Under the leadership of the recently returned émigré,
Vladimir Lenin, the Bolsheviks called for “all power to the soviets,” for “bread and
peace,” and for the nationalization of industry. On 25 October, 1917 (New-Style: 7
November) Lenin and the Bolsheviks led an armed uprising against the provisional
government in Petrograd. After a day of fighting, the provisional government was
overthrown. A Bolshevik Party that had never once been responsible for governing set
out to translate its revolutionary ideology into reality.
3
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Bolshevik leaders quickly discovered that it was much easier in practice to oppose
power than to exercise it. Almost immediately, a conflict revealed itself between the
egalitarian ideology of the party and the harsh reality of governing a nation of one
hundred and fifty million people. Bolsheviks lamented what they saw as the
dehumanizing forces of capitalism; many firmly believed their seizure of power would
result in the triumph of a more just society. In their propaganda the Bolsheviks claimed
they were taking power in the name of the soviets, an institution which in 1917
represented a form of direct democracy. The soviets were to allow the impoverished
masses a direct role in governing for the first time in Russia’s history. In the place of
exploitative forms of industrial organization the Bolsheviks envisioned a workplace
where the workers would control the means of production and organize their own labor in
a fashion that was both more productive and more equitable. In the countryside, land was
to be redistributed to the peasants who worked it; the ideal was a collective form of
agriculture free from the gross inequalities that had for so long afflicted rural Russia.
Even the military, traditionally the most authoritarian of institutions, was to be
humanized and made more democratic. Ranks and harsh discipline were to be replaced
with collegial forms of command and voluntary service. Last but not least, the state itself
as a coercive institution was to wither away. Lenin summarized the Bolshevik ideal for
the long term: “Socialism will shorten the working day, will raise the masses to a new
life, will create conditions for the majority of the population that will enable everybody,
without exception, to perform state functions, and this will lead to the complete withering
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away of the state in general.”4 Some Bolshevik followers interpreted Lenin’s plan as a
call for an immediate reduction in the state’s coercive powers.
While many Bolsheviks had faith their program would indeed lead to a more just
society, it was not without its violent, dictatorial overtones. The Bolsheviks took pride in
their contempt for “bourgeois democracy.” They advocated a violent revolution that
would forcibly suppress “class enemies.” What is more, the Bolsheviks paid lip-service to
the principle of proletarian democracy but refused to honor it in practice. In its place,
Lenin advocated a highly centralized, authoritarian party where an elite of socialist
intellectuals would take power in the name of the workers. Since Russia was by its very
nature backwards and lacked an advanced working-class, it would be necessary for a
small party of intellectuals to implement those policies that were “truly” in the interests
of the workers. To ensure political orthodoxy, this party would be closed to the majority
of radicals who lacked proper “consciousness.” In reality the Bolshevik revolution would
therefore involve the seizure of power by a tiny handful of revolutionary ideologues, not
by the majority of the people. Nothing could be more authoritarian than a state where a
numerically insignificant elite determines what is best for the rest of society, yet this is
exactly the program to which the party adhered. Lenin stated: “Without the ‘dozen’ tried
and talented leaders (and talented men are not born by the hundred), professionally
trained, schooled by long experience and working in perfect harmony, no class in modern
society is capable of conducting a determined struggle.”5

4
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By 1917, a sizeable gap existed between the Bolsheviks’ chosen ends and the
means they found acceptable to achieve them. Trotsky himself was not unaware of this
contradiction. Following the rupture of the Russian Social Democratic Party in 1903,
Trotsky had affiliated with the Menshevik wing that opposed Lenin’s more authoritarian
Bolsheviks. He directly attacked Lenin for what he saw as “dictatorial tendencies.” Still
over the course of 1917, the perceived vacillation of the provisional government had led
Trotsky to become disillusioned with his Menshevik peers. By the summer of that year,
he had had enough, and joined the Bolshevik Party. Trotsky saw the Bolsheviks as the
only group capable of radically transforming society along Marxist lines. In joining a
party that openly preached violence and minority rule, he embraced Lenin’s authoritarian
vision of the revolution. In pursuing their reorganization of Russia, the Bolsheviks would
in practice deny power to the very classes in whose name they governed. Trotsky’s
biographer Isaac Deutscher gave a sympathetic portrayal of this dilemma: “The
circumstance that the Bolsheviks were the party of the revolution impelled them first to
identify the revolution with themselves, and then to reduce the revolution to being
exclusively an affair of their party.”6
Within months of seizing power, the Bolshevik Party entrusted Trotsky with the
monumental task of creating an army for the socialist state. The Red Army would quickly
become the largest agency in the nascent Bolshevik Republic. As a major institution, it
provided a crucial example of the manner in which the party would negotiate between its
egalitarian ideology and its stated preference for coercive methods. Trotsky promised his
Red Army would represent a new type of army, emblematic of a new type of proletarian
6
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state. Three years of brutal civil war would put this claim to the test. The results would
radically impact the lives of millions of Soviet citizens and the future of Russia itself.
The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine how the methods Trotsky used
to create the Red Army affected both the outcome of the civil war and the evolution of
the Bolshevik state. I will argue that Trotsky did not adhere to the party’s ideological
orthodoxy while constructing the army. Instead, he built the army using methods he
believed would lead to a Red victory. He did not hesitate to adopt features of the tsarist
predecessor. This cost him political support, but ultimately led to a fighting force capable
of victory. At the end of the war Trotsky took his success as an inducement to apply
militarization to other areas of the Bolshevik state, including the economy. The
devastation of war and popular unrest prevented him from fully implementing these
ideas. I show that the trend of ideological compromise Trotsky embodied was
symptomatic of a larger trend. By the end of the war the Bolshevik state had failed to
make good on many of its ideological promises and alienated many supporters. The need
to maintain power in this hostile atmosphere led to more compromising of Bolshevik
ideals.
To build my argument I have included three chapters. My first chapter outlines
the growing military threats that greeted Trotsky’s appointment as War Commissar in
1918. It documents Trotsky’s controversial adoption of “conventional” military policies
including conscription, strict discipline, and the use of former tsarist officers. His
pragmatism is contrasted with Bolshevik purists who argued for a strictly volunteer
militia. The second chapter deals with the year 1919, which witnessed the bulk of the
civil war’s fighting. It details Trotsky’s moderately successful defense of his military
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policy at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. Later in the year fighting escalated, and
the Red Army successfully fought off serious challenges from Admiral Kolchak’s
directorate in the east, General Denikin’s Volunteers in the south, and General
Yudenich’s army in the northwest. The third and final chapter explores Trotsky’s attempt
to apply military methods to the economy in 1920. War with Poland temporarily
interrupted his experiment in the summer and fall. Economic collapse and widespread
discontent amongst the citizenry forced Lenin to abandon militarization at the 10th Party
Congress in 1921. The result was the New Economic Policy, a pragmatic retreat that
echoed the ideological compromise witnessed during the building of the Red Army.
My thesis draws on five volumes of Trotsky’s military writings from the Civil
War period for its primary sources. These writings include policy memoranda, speeches,
military orders, and other documents of interest. They offer valuable insight into both
Trotsky’s thinking and into the methods he employed to build the army. I have also relied
on numerous histories of Trotsky, the Red Army, and the Civil War. The most important
biography of Trotsky is Isaac Deutscher’s three-volume series written in the 1950s, from
which I have drawn extensively. Deutscher’s account borders on hagiography, but it
recounts Trotsky’s life in great detail and is factually accurate. Trotsky also wrote his
own autobiography, My Life. Other biographies are more recent, and include Robert
Service’s Trotsky, Dmitri Volkogonov’s Trotsky: The Eternal Revolutionary, and
Bertrand Patenaude’s Trotsky: Downfall of a Revolutionary--- which deals with
Trotsky’s fall from political grace and exile from the USSR.
Histories of the Civil War period in English began with William Chamberlin’s
The Russian Revolution Vol. II, 1918-1921, which I have refrained from using heavily
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due to its age. I have mainly relied on W. Bruce Lincoln’s Red Victory and Richard
Pipes’ Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. Lincoln’s work is the most thorough general
narrative to date. Pipes’ account is highly critical of the Bolshevik regime, and highlights
Bolshevik atrocities. Mark Von Hagen’s Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship and
Francesco Benvenuti’s The Bolsheviks and the Red Army, 1918-1922 offer insights into
early Red Army policy. Norman Davies’ White Eagle, Red Star was a competent
retelling of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. Israel Getzler’s Kronstadt, 1917-1921 was an
insightful window into both the Kronstadt mutiny and the transformation of Russia’s
political climate during the civil war. Similarly, Robert Daniels’ Conscience of the
Revolution and Vladimir Brovkin’s Behind the Frontlines of the Civil War provided
critical information about the interplay between Russian society and Bolshevik politics
during the war.
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Chapter One--- Trotsky and the Beginning of the Civil War in 1917-1918
“Comrades! Our Soviet Socialist Republic needs a well-organized army.”- Lev Trotsky7

On 13 March 1918 Lev Davidovich Trotsky resigned his position as People’s
Commissar for Foreign Affairs. The same day he replaced Nikolai Podvoisky as People’s
Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs. Trotsky was also appointed Chairman of the
Supreme Military Council, a military advisory body of former tsarist officers that he had
helped to create weeks earlier. As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky acted as the
Bolshevik’s chief negotiator during the peace talks with Imperial Germany. These
negotiations culminated in the unpopular Brest-Litovsk treaty that was signed on 3
March. Just as peace with Germany had been the Bolsheviks’ principal concern in their
first days of power, now security became a top Bolshevik priority. Enemies both foreign
and domestic threatened to drive the Bolsheviks from power by force. In order to
maintain its increasingly precarious control, the party would have to develop an effective

7
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military force to contain these threats. As the leading figure in the nascent Red Army,
Trotsky was being entrusted with the fate of the Bolshevik Republic.
Trotsky’s appointment came as no surprise. He was widely recognized as one of
the most intelligent leaders of the Bolshevik Party. For two decades he had been writing
on questions of radical theory and socialist politics. He had demonstrated his loyalty to
the revolutionary cause during two stints of imprisonment and exile under the tsar. He
played a role in the 1905 Revolution as vice-chairman of the first St. Petersburg Soviet.
After the defeat of the 1905 Revolution, Trotsky escaped abroad where he continued his
socialist agitation working as a journalist and scholar. As a journalist covering the
Balkans Wars of 1912-13 Trotsky, “delved into problems of supply, military training, and
tactics, and revealed the atrocities and primitive cruelty of the war.”8 His journalistic
observations of World War I in France showed a similar concern for both technical and
human aspects of military affairs. In 1917 first-hand experience of warfare was rare
among leading Bolsheviks: they generally had only superficial experience of army life
and fighting techniques. During the October Revolution of 1917 Trotsky directed much
of the power seizure in the Russian capital while serving as chairman of the Bolshevikmajority Petrograd Soviet.
Many leading Bolsheviks resented Trotsky’s appointment as head of the Red
Army. For over a decade prior to 1917 (when he finally joined the Bolsheviks), Trotsky
had affiliated himself with the Menshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic
Party. During the Menshevik-Bolshevik dispute, Trotsky had directed bitterly personal
attacks at the Bolsheviks’ leader, Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Consequently, some Bolsheviks
8
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perceived Trotsky’s appointment as a grave ideological threat to the party’s orthodox
position on matters of military policy and national security. Outgoing Bolshevik military
leaders such as Nikolai Podvoisky and Nikolai Krylenko had been committed to
demobilization of the old Imperial forces and to the abolition of the standing army. In
general, they opposed the “reactionary” military policies of the Provisional Government
and the tsar.
Before Trotsky could begin to formulate his own policies for the army, he would
have to come to terms with the revolutionary military policies of his predecessors. As he
did so, he confronted growing threats from the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army in the
south; organized rebellion in Siberia, the Urals, and on the Volga; hunger and unrest in
Russia’s cities; national secession movements on Russia’s periphery; and foreign
intervention against the Bolshevik government. In this chapter I will analyze the situation
Trotsky inherited in March of 1918, the military threats of early 1918, the Bolshevik
ideological framework for dealing with military problems, and Trotsky’s initial efforts to
build the Red Army.
The situation facing Trotsky in March 1918 was grim. By then Bolsheviks’ initial
optimism had faded. The Bolshevik’s seizure of power in Petrograd in October 1917 was
a relatively bloodless coup. Days after taking power, the Bolsheviks had defended their
new government from an assault by counter-revolutionary soldiers on the outskirts of
Petrograd. This “battle” turned out to be little more than an unorganized skirmish. In it
the Bolsheviks relied on workers’ militias popularly known as “Red Guards” and on a
handful of sympathetic soldiers and sailors. Pitched battles similar to the Petrograd
skirmish were fought in Moscow and in several provincial cities during the weeks
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following the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power. Less than a month after the successful
Revolution of November 7, the Bolsheviks (or local soviets nominally aligned with them)
held power in the most important population centers of central Russia.
Many Bolsheviks expected the initial skirmishing to be the height of the party’s
involvement in waging conventional warfare. Many Bolsheviks (including Trotsky
himself) assumed that the October Revolution would touch off a global upheaval that
would establish a new, proletarian world order. In December of 1917 Josef Stalin and
Vladimir Lenin jointly proclaimed, “the Peoples of Europe, exhausted by the War, are
already stretching out their hands to us and creating peace. The workers and soldiers of
the West are already gathering under the banner of socialism.”9 The more dogmatic Party
faithful pronounced that Imperial Germany would soon halt its attacks on the Soviet
Republic because its workers would soon seize power. As some party members predicted
peace, more realistic Bolsheviks prepared for war.
At this stage, few Bolsheviks concerned about defending socialism advocated the
creation of a regular army. Because popular militias had been sufficient for the seizure of
power, many Bolsheviks assumed these same forces would prove adequate to preserve
Soviet power. Therefore, the Bolsheviks’ first steps to establish a regular defense called
for expanding local Red Guards forces into a nation-wide socialist militia. For this
purpose the Soviet government proclaimed, “the arming of the workers… and the
complete disarmament of the propertied classes are decreed in order to assure all power
for the workers.”10 Workers (and not peasants) were at this time encouraged to organize
local militias that would be placed under the control of the local soviets. Through the
9
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hierarchy of the soviets these individual workers’ brigades would theoretically be
accountable to the Military Organization of the Bolsheviks’ Central Committee. In
reality, the Bolsheviks failed to work out an effective manner of coordinating these
militias.
In the first months of Soviet power the Bolsheviks’ most effective shock-troops
were those units of the Imperial Army that subordinated themselves to the new Soviet
power. Three brigades of Latvian riflemen (totaling 35,000 men) accepted the
Bolsheviks’ promises of working-class power, an equitable distribution of agricultural
land, and an end to Russian involvement in the First World War. In 1918 the Soviet
government relied heavily on the Latvians to suppress local rebellions and maintain their
control over disputed territories. The historian Richard Pipes has observed: “The Latvians
rendered the Bolsheviks invaluable services: dispersing the Constituent Assembly,
putting down the Left SR uprising, defending the Volga from the Czechs, and guarding
their persons from potential assassins.”11 Yet the Latvians were far too few in number to
defend the Soviet Republic alone. By March 1918 it was clear the Bolsheviks would have
to dramatically expand their combat-ready armed forces.
Three years of the most brutal fighting in Russia’s history had taken their toll on
the peasant conscripts who made up the vast bulk of the nation’s fighting troops. As Mark
von Hagen noted in his study of the Red Army, “the soldiers understood the
[Bolsheviks’] peace proclamations [of October 1917] to be the first step towards the
general demobilization they had been awaiting… thousands of soldiers simply departed
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for home, many to take part in the redistribution of lands in the countryside.”12 Within the
first months of Bolshevik power the pace of mass desertion was accelerated when the
new Soviet government banned corporal punishment in the military, outlawed military
disciplinary courts, and abolished military ranks. The party encouraged soldiers to form
their own democratic committees and to elect their own officers. When these soldiers
abandoned their posts, officers could do nothing to prevent them. The Soviet government
had done away with the officer corps’s disciplinary powers.
The administrative structures the new government put in place to command the
military were ineffective. Upon taking power, the Bolsheviks created two organs directly
responsible for military policy. The Military-Naval Committee of the Second Congress of
the Soviets was responsible for setting military policies. The People’s Commissariat for
Military Affairs (also known as Narkomvoena, later renamed the People’s Commissariat
for Army and Navy Affairs after Trotsky took over) was responsible for the day-to-day
control of those military forces that still answered to the authority of the Bolshevik Party.
These groups included the Red Guards and the remnants of the Imperial Army’s General
Staff. In practice, the authority of the Military Committee and Narkomvoena often overlapped. Local soviets also interfered in military policy-making. The competition between
bureaucratic organs with shared responsibilities would characterize Soviet governance at
all levels for much of its early history; military affairs were especially impaired by this
trend.
In December 1917 an All-Army Conference on Demobilization was called by the
Bolsheviks’ military authorities. In spite of the conference’s mandate to establish a
12
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demobilization policy, demobilization proceeded haphazardly, outside the government’s
control. Therefore the conference concentrated more on creating a new army and on
saving what was left of the old one. On 30 December, the conference passed a resolution
endorsing the creation of “a New, Socialist Army” to be formed exclusively of workingclass volunteers with ‘revolutionary credentials’ from Russia’s urban areas.13 What
remained of the old General Staff were dismissed when they proposed building the new
army from a core of 1,300,000 soldiers still serving on the fronts. While rejecting their
proposals, the Bolsheviks ordered the General Staff to assist the government in
maintaining order at the fronts until new, “socialist” divisions could be formed in the
rear. In practice this proved impossible; Soviet decrees on everything from land policy to
discipline in the Army had made the collapse of the old military formations inevitable.
Before it dispersed, the conference created an organization that would eventually
be known as “the All-Russian Collegiate for the Formation of the Red Army.” The
Collegiate founded the Red Army on 28 January 1918. It set out to organize the new
army in the rear based on democratic, volunteerist principles; officers would be elected
and non-working class recruits were to be dismissed. Thanks to the combination of
societal chaos and flimsy administrative capacity on the part of the Collegiate, the Red
Army existed only on paper at the time of Trotsky’s appointment as army commissar.
Nominally, the Red Army commanded hundreds of thousands of troops at its birth, but
this was a gross exaggeration of its true strength. As the military scholar John Erickson
observed of the Red Army at that point in time, “the number of men was no real index---

13
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what counted was trained manpower, and the Soviet regime could command perhaps
50,000 trained men.”14
On 18 February 1918 the Germans broke the armistice with Soviet Russia. It did
not take long for them to make deep inroads into Russian territory. With a few
exceptions, the Russian soldiers still at their posts retreated without fighting. As the
Germans advanced unimpeded, the Bolsheviks rushed loyal Red Guards to the battlefield
in an attempt to stabilize the front. The Red Guards were decisively defeated while
inflicting minimal casualties on the Germans. Von Hagen has noted, “the Red Army, for
all their political attractiveness and their success in skirmishes against domestic
opponents, proved incapable of resisting a modern mass army. The Germans advanced
virtually unimpeded.”15 The immediate result of the Bolsheviks’ pathetic military
performance was the humiliating treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Bolsheviks were forced to
renounce all claims on Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland.
Much of this territory had been considered to be an integral part of the larger Russian
polity. Russians on both the left and right were appalled at the harsh terms of peace;
many held the Bolsheviks to be solely responsible for this humiliation.
Brest-Litovsk led the Bolsheviks to realize that they would have to dramatically
increase their military capacities, regardless of whether or not the methods used accorded
with revolutionary ideology. At the same, time the treaty dramatically undermined
popular support for the regime. Lack of popular support heightened the urgency of
solving the military question in the eyes of party leaders. Unfortunately for the
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Bolsheviks, the German victory also reduced the Bolsheviks’ ability to field a combatready army. The historian Nicholas Riasanovsky observed of Brest-Litovsk’s results:
“Russia lost 26 percent of her total population, 27 percent of her arable land; 32 percent
of her average crops; 26 percent of her railway system; 33 percent of her manufacturing
industries; 73 percent of her iron industries; 75 percent of her coal fields.”16 At this bleak
moment, Trotsky assumed the position of People’s Commissar for Army and Navy
Affairs. His decision to reform the Red Army would be conditioned both by the events
preceding his appointment, as well as the numerous threats the Soviet Republic
confronted in the wake of the Brest treaty.
The most serious military threat confronting the Bolsheviks in March 1918 was
the White Volunteer Army (Dobrovolcheskaya Armiya) operating in the Kuban. The
Volunteer Army was a small force, but its perceived effectiveness made it a grave threat
in the eyes of the Bolsheviks. Its formation started with the flight of General Mikhail
Alekseev from Moscow to the lands of the Don Cossacks after the October Revolution.
Alekseev was a distinguished general who had coordinated the Russian armed forces
from 1915 until the Bolshevik seizure of power. He was appalled by the Bolsheviks’
willingness to abandon the fight against Imperial Germany. Many scholars have argued
that the original White volunteers were motivated as much by their desire to honor
Russia’s commitments in the First World War and to prevent social chaos, as they were
by the desire to overthrow socialism and to restore conservative power. Pipes spoke for
this school when he attributed the beginning of the Civil War to “a small band of patriotic
officers, humiliated by the destruction of the Russian Army and the Bolshevik
16
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government’s betrayal of commitments to the Allies, who decided to continue the war
against the Central Powers.”17
The Volunteers’ struggle to preserve the Russian war effort began in the lands of
the Don Cossacks, hundreds of miles from both German armies and Bolshevik power.
This isolation promised Alekseev a relative safe-haven where he could grow his
miniscule forces. At the beginning of March 1918 the Volunteers had fewer than 3,000
soldiers bearing arms. They were drawn almost exclusively from the old Imperial officer
corps, because rank-and-file soldiers were generally unwilling to serve in a force so
heavily composed of officers whom they perceived as symbols of tsarist oppression.
Recruiting increased pace when Alekseev was joined by General Lavr Kornilov at the
end of 1917. Kornilov, famous for his purported coup attempt against the Provisional
Government in August 1917, was charismatic but brash and impetuous. Alekseev and
Kornilov quickly butted heads when Kornilov attempted to take command of the recruits
Alekseev had organized. A deal was brokered giving Alekseev control of the army’s
finances and political relations, while Kornilov was given sole command of military
operations. At this point the Volunteer Army numbered around 4,000 troops, not
including its unreliable Don Cossack allies.
The appearance of the Volunteer Army did not catch the Bolsheviks off guard. By
January the Bolsheviks had dispatched a force of 7,000 men armed with tsarist weapons
to the Don to combat the ill-supplied Whites. Hunger was threatening the Bolshevikcontrolled cities in Central Russia, and the Party was determined to regain control of this
important grain-producing region at all costs. Fortunately for the Bolsheviks, the Don
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Cossacks failed to support their White allies. Many younger Cossacks who had served in
the Great War disliked serving alongside former tsarist officers, and some disobeyed their
elders’ orders to aid the Volunteers. After the pro-White ataman Alexis Kaledin
committed suicide in February, the Don Cossacks temporarily abandoned the Volunteers;
without Cossack support the Volunteers were no match for the more numerous
Bolsheviks. To avoid complete annihilation at the hands of the Reds, General Kornilov
led his troops on a brutal retreat through enemy territory to the anti-Bolshevik stronghold
of the Kuban Cossacks. The retreat is popularly referred to as “the Ice March.” Pipes
extolled the Volunteers’ heroism: “The small band of Volunteers traversed hostile
territory, harassed by inogorodnye [landless peasants originally from outside the Don
region] and pro-Bolshevik deserters, braving savage cold and freezing rain, short of food,
clothing, and weapons.”18 One out of four White soldiers died on the march, including
General Kornilov. Fortunately for the Whites, the Red offensive had dissipated by April.
After Kornilov’s death the capable General Denikin took command of the Volunteers as
they began to recover their strength in the relative safety of the Kuban. Despite the
Volunteers’ retreat, the Bolsheviks still considered the threat of armed opposition very
real.
Equally threatening to Bolshevik security was urban hunger. Harsh measures the
Bolsheviks took to combat the food shortage increased security risks. By October 1917
the Russian economy had been on the verge of collapse, with industries producing at a
fraction of their pre-war levels and the transportation system in collapse. The trains still
running were sometimes commandeered by deserters or bandits. Grain rotted on rail
18
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sidings for lack of working locomotives to haul it. Russia’s vast internal distances, harsh
weather, and poor road infrastructure made it difficult to ship grain by other means. By
late 1917 the Russian currency was virtually worthless. Together, the imploding currency
and declining supply of badly-needed industrial goods led many peasants to hoard their
grain.
The results of this dilemma were predictable. W. Bruce Lincoln makes clear how
bad the situation was by the beginning of 1918: “Although experts estimated that a
laborer required an absolute minimum of 2,700 calories to survive, a Petrograder’s daily
rations supplied 1,395 calories.”19 As food deliveries to the cities became more
infrequent, hunger worsened. Tens of thousands of civilians living in Bolshevikcontrolled urban areas starved to death during the winter of 1917/1918. Even supporters
of the October Revolution turned against Bolshevik power when they could no longer
find food to feed their families. Growing discontent manifested itself in the increasing
frequency of strikes, food riots, and even armed protests against the Soviet regime. The
significance of this restive behavior was not lost on Party leaders; it all seemed eerily
reminiscent of the disturbances that had helped bring down the tsar in February 1917.
Despite the combination of impassioned appeals for calm and harsh police measures to
combat unrest, the situation failed to improve.
Hungry city-dwellers fled their residences in droves to return to their old villages,
where they hoped to have greater access to food supplies. Lincoln described the exodus
from Petrograd as so vast that “seven out of every ten men and women who had lived
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there in 1917 no longer remained in the summer of 1920.”20 The depletion of the urban
workforce led to a further decline in industrial output. Few laborers remained at their
work-stations; those who did were often too weak from starvation to be productive. The
combination of hunger and mass urban emigration threatened the Bolsheviks sway over
the lynchpin of Soviet power, the proletariat. A “socialist” army could not be constructed
when the workers it sought to mobilize had either fled the cities or were joining the
opposition.
If starvation in Russia’s cities undermined Bolshevik power, the measures taken
in the countryside to combat the hunger only made things worse. In the aftermath of the
October Revolution, many peasants tepidly supported the Bolsheviks, mainly out of
gratitude for the party’s decree on land. But peasants expected the new socialist regime to
leave them to work the land in peace with minimal government intrusion. Russia’s
peasants were in for a rude awakening. At first the party attempted to convince the
peasantry voluntarily to part with their grain. Agents of the Soviet Republic were
dispatched to the villages to barter industrial goods for grain. By late 1917, however the
cities had run out of goods to barter; the worthless currency proved equally ineffective in
convincing the peasants to part with their grain.
Lenin and other hardliners in the party argued the time had come for drastic
measures. Armed detachments of Bolshevik supporters--- the so-called ‘food brigades’--were dispatched from the cities to seize “hoarded” grain at gunpoint. With typical zeal
Lenin proclaimed: “We did not hesitate to wrest the land away from the landlords, to
transfer the factories, mills, and railroads into the hands of the people… and by force of
20
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arms, to tear the crown from the stupid tsar’s head. Why then should we hesitate to take
the grain away from the kulaks?”21 As part of the new coercive policy, the Bolsheviks
established a Dictatorship of Food Supply on 9 May 1918. The new “Dictatorship”
enlisted thousands more workers from Russia’s cities to participate in grainrequisitioning. These armed workers wreaked havoc across the countryside of central
Russia. It did not take long for the Russian peasants’ position of benevolent neutrality
towards the Soviet regime to grow into opposition.
To add insult to injury, the Bolsheviks attempted to introduce militant class
struggle into villages. Although peasant communities were largely free from the stark
income inequality of the cities, the Bolsheviks classified villagers as poor, middle, or rich
peasants (kulaks). Food brigades treated poor peasants as supporters, but “kulaks” were
subjected to discriminatory measures, or worse. Even when the poor peasants willingly
embraced Bolshevik ideas of class conflict, the results were not always what the
Bolsheviks intended. “Rich” peasants would comply with the Bolsheviks at gun-point,
then retaliate against Bolshevik sympathizers after the food brigades had left. Bolshevik
supporters were beaten, evicted from their homes, and decidedly ostracized. Many party
sympathizers suffered violent deaths similar to those meted out by the Bolsheviks to
“kulaks.” The Bolsheviks’ combination of violent agitation and armed extortion turned
vast stretches of the countryside into enemy territory. After 1918, the Bolsheviks could
not rely on the peasantry for food or to send willing conscripts to the new Soviet army.
For the remainder of the Civil War the Bolsheviks would enter rural areas at their own
risk.
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The most serious internal threat to Soviet power erupted in May 1918 with the
revolt of the 60,000-strong Czechoslovak Legion. The Czechoslovak Legion was one of
several groups of national minorities mobilized to fight against the Austro-German
alliance during World War I. The soldiers of the Legion wanted to win independence
from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Not surprisingly, tensions erupted between the new
Soviet government and the Czechoslovaks in the wake of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. With
the assistance of Entente diplomats, a deal was brokered whereby the Bolsheviks agreed
to transport the Legion to Vladivostok via the Trans-Siberian Railway. From there the
legionnaires would be transported by allied ships back to Europe, where they would fight
against the Austro-Germans on the fields of France. Unfortunately for both sides, the
evacuation stalled as the performance of Russia’s rail network rapidly deteriorated. The
Legion grew increasingly impatient with their Bolshevik hosts. When Trotsky ordered
contingents of the Legion to surrender their weapons in May 1918, the Czechoslovaks
rose up in open revolt.
At this point the Legion was scattered across Western Siberia and throughout the
Volga region. The first objective of the wayward legionnaires was to unite their forces so
they could fight their way across Siberia. Eventually they hoped to make their way to
Vladivostok where they would be evacuated. During summer 1918 the Legion seized
cities across the Volga region and Siberia. Samara, Ufa, Saratov, and Simbirsk all fell
rapidly to them. By early August 1918 much of the Volga, the Urals, and a good part of
Siberia were occupied by the Legion. Opposition governments sprang up in the areas that
had been cleared of Bolsheviks. In Samara a coalition of Socialist-Revolutionaries (SRs)
proclaimed a new government in the name of the disposed Constituent Assembly
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popularly referred to as “Komuch.” Another coalition government of anti-Bolshevik
forces was proclaimed at Omsk in Siberia. Though both of these governments were
initially quite weak, they were protected from harassment by the Legion. If allowed to
develop, these opposition governments would have become rival centers of political
authority in Russia. On 7 August 1918 the Czechoslovak Legion (accompanied by lessskilled Komuch soldiers) captured Kazan from Bolshevik forces. With just five hundred
miles (and no effective military opposition) between Legion-occupied Kazan and the
Bolshevik capital at Moscow, many believed the Soviet regime to be incredibly
vulnerable. What few soldiers the Red Army could reliably muster were concentrated in
the southern and western peripheries; no surplus forces were prepared to move east. If the
Bolsheviks were to guarantee their weak grip on power, a larger, more effective fighting
force would have to materialize quickly. Trotsky’s ability to rapidly mobilize a capable
response to the unexpected threat from the East would stretch his abilities as an organizer
to their limits.
No threat was viewed with more apprehension by the Bolsheviks than the
prospect of foreign intervention. Russia’s wartime allies had greeted the October
Revolution with wary ambivalence. Any pretext of neutrality swiftly vanished in the
wake of the Soviet-German peace. At the beginning of March small contingents of
British marines had landed at the port of Murmansk to secure allied munitions intended
for the war effort against Germany. By late April over 2,000 allied troops had landed at
Murmansk. Relations between the Bolsheviks and the allies deteriorated rapidly. At the
beginning of May 1918 the allied forces occupied Murmansk. The revolt of the
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Czechoslovak Legion increased the allies’ desire to intervene on a more widespread
scale. Britain began to deliver arms and supplies to anti-Bolshevik military forces.
At the beginning of July another expeditionary force of five-thousand allied
troops was dispatched to occupy the port of Archangelsk. These forces would secure the
supply lines linking the allies to anti-Bolshevik militants. According to Lincoln, “by midJuly, the allies had committed themselves to wage a full-fledged offensive in some of the
roughest terrain and most inhospitable climate to be found anywhere in the Western
world.”22 On July 6 President Wilson had overcome his initial misgivings surrounding
armed intervention in Russia and agreed to send 7,000 troops secure arms shipments to
the Legion through the Pacific port of Vladivostok. By August combined forces totaling
in the thousand of allied troops were flowing into the now-occupied capital of Russia’s
Far East.
The allied troops would largely refrain from taking an active role in combat
against the Bolsheviks’ forces. Still, few could have predicted this in the middle of 1918.
Many of the Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin himself, openly expected the worst.
Fearing intervention, Bolshevik leaders issued panicky demands for mass mobilization.
At the height of the crisis, the Central Executive Committee called for the augmenting of
Red forces with a million additional troops. It is highly unlikely that any number of
troops that the Bolsheviks were capable of fielding in 1918 would have been able to resist
a full-fledged allied assault, but the new sense of urgency still made an impression. The
need to defend Soviet power against foreign intervention gave new impetus to the push
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for a strong Red Army capable of simultaneously fielding millions of troops across
multiple fronts.
Before we can examine the interaction between Trotsky’s military pragmatism
and Bolshevik ideology, we must first revisit the Bolshevik’s institutional framework for
determining military policy. When Trotsky took over control of military affairs in March
1918, there were two main bodies responsible for matters of defense: the Supreme
Military Soviet (Verkhovnyi Voennyi Soviet) and ‘the All-Russia Collegiate for the
Administration of the Worker-Peasant Red Army (All-Russia Collegiate). The VVS,
formed immediately prior to Trotsky’s appointment, was largely composed of former
Imperial officers. The All-Russia Collegiate had a heavier party contingent, and was
therefore the preferred partner of those communists in the government who had not been
specifically assigned to deal with military affairs. The two bodies had overlapping areas
of responsibility. While both were subordinate to the party, there was no clear delineation
of their authority. Erickson has observed “the creation of the VVS… ushered in what
Soviet historians call the period of ‘parallelism’ in the early history of the Red Army: two
concepts of an army, two sources of command, and two images of ‘the enemy’.”23 As
Army Commissar, Trotsky was in charge of both bodies, but one man could not prevent
competition between the two organizations. In the end the only thing guaranteeing a
semblance of coherency to Bolshevik military policy was the dominance of Trotsky. He
answered to the party for his decisions, but in between arty meetings he had a free-hand
in building the Red Army.
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This brings us back to the growing tension between previous party doctrine on
matters of defense, and Trotsky’s pragmatic approach to building the Red Army. As
revolutionary socialists, the Bolsheviks respected the judgments of Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels on matters of ideology, yet Marx and Engels had written very little on
military policy. They had considered armies in the context of their analysis of the state.
According to the Marxist canon, all states are repressive bodies with organized
contingents of armed men responsible for maintaining the rule of an oppressor class over
the oppressed. In practice these armed contingents are what we would refer to as the army
and police. According to Engels: “Public power exists in every state; it consists not
merely of armed people but also of material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion
of all kinds.”24 Similar descriptions encouraged the Bolsheviks to think of armies
primarily as a means of maintaining the class divisions of bourgeois society. Not
surprisingly, many Bolsheviks assumed that, according to Marx, there would be no need
for an army under socialism. These assumptions led the more dogmatic Bolsheviks
vociferously to reject a standing army in the new socialist state.
Trotsky refrained from challenging Marx’s and Engels’views of military affairs.
Indeed he embraced it. According to Trotsky, the nascent Soviet Republic was the
embodiment of proletarian-class rule. While the socialist state would eventually give way
to the classless society of communism, at the present moment it would be suicidal to
dispense with the standing-armies. Far from threatening the revolutionary character of the
Soviet state, a standing army would secure proletarian power in Bolshevik Russia. As
Trotsky put it, “the army being formed will conform to the nature of the classes which
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now hold power; this army will not become a fresh factor of disorganization and
disintegration, but will be the fighting organ of these new ruling classes.”25
Most Bolsheviks agreed with Trotsky that some form of military organization was
necessary, but they disagreed about the shape the army would take. “Orthodox”
Bolsheviks thought the Red Army should rely on volunteers; conscription was a detested
relic of the tsarist past that no socialist power could seriously adopt in good faith. Early in
1918, Podvoisky and Krylenko proclaimed that instead of an army based on forced
conscription, the Red Army should consist of volunteers. Erickson detailed the initial
plans: “The ‘new’ army made up of soldier-volunteers would comprise 144 infantry
regiments (36 divisions, each of 10,000 men)… a ‘Socialist army’ built ‘on elective
principles, on the principles of mutual comradely respect and discipline.’”26
Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, few seemed interested in volunteering to serve the
Soviet Republic in battle after four years of continuous and bloody fighting. Erickson
noted that by February 1918, “volunteerism had virtually failed. Of the 30,000 Red
Guards, 10,000 were in a condition of ‘military readiness’ though latterly discipline and
order had broken down at a sharp rate.”27
Trotsky understood clearly the failure of the volunteer army. Less than a month
after becoming army commissar, Trotsky laid the groundwork for an army built on the
principles of universal military conscription. On 22 April 1918 he paid lip-service to the
principles of “universal disarmament, permanent peace, and fraternal cooperation
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between all peoples inhabiting the earth.”28 The real subject of his talk was mandatory
military service. “The Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of the Republic deems it its
immediate task to enroll all citizens for compulsory labor and military service… Military
training is compulsory for male citizens of the Russian Soviet Federative Republic.”29
Trotsky knew that whatever disadvantages the Bolsheviks may have had in military
expertise when compared to the Volunteer Army, the Soviet regime still had an
overwhelming superiority in manpower. The trick was to find a way to exploit this
untapped resource; volunteerism had failed but conscription was still untested. Any
doubts the party may have had concerning Trotsky’s recruitment policies largely
vanished in the wake of the Czechoslovaks’ revolt. On 29 May 1918 the Central
Executive Committee of the Soviets issued a decree requiring mandatory military service
for working-class males under 40. By the end of August, over 540,000 men had been
pressed into service with the Red Army.
The Executive Committee’s decree exposed a point of growing concern for many
Bolsheviks: the class character of the new Red Army. Trotsky himself had justified the
standing army by emphasizing its proletarian character; party hardliners were anxious to
prevent other classes from bearing arms in the socialist state. During the volunteer period
prior to Trotsky’s appointment, eligibility for military service had been strictly limited to
members of the working-class. Bolshevik exclusivity stemmed from more than
puritanical impulses to maintain “class purity.” Marxist ideology interpreted the army and
police as repressive agencies whose purpose was to maintain the hegemony of the ruling
28
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class. If the classes manning these agencies had aims contradicting those of the ruling
class, they were no longer perceived as reliable. Therefore many Bolsheviks regarded the
inclusion of other classes into the Red Army and the police as threats to the workingclass. Trotsky himself did not dispute the desirability of having a fighting force made up
exclusively of the proletariat.
Yet the number of workers even capable of serving in the armed forces fell far
short of the total required to provide for socialism’s effective defense. Trotsky knew the
extra troops would have to come from somewhere; the question was where. Recruitment
(i.e. conscription) targeted people from working-class backgrounds but also “poor”
peasants. If these peasants had provided armed assistance to grain-requisitioning
detachments in the villages, why couldn’t they serve the Soviets on the field of battle?
Still, class origin was a serious matter for leading Bolsheviks, so Trotsky was careful not
to move too quickly. Initial mobilizations still relied primarily on the working-class. Not
until late summer 1918 did the army begin to call up peasants in sizeable numbers. In the
meantime, Trotsky referred repeatedly to the worker-and-peasant-based nature of Soviet
power. The village poor were depicted as rural workers. In May Trotsky asked his
listeners: “Can we doubt, comrades, that the fraternal alliance between the town workers
and the village poor will be strengthened?”30 In forming the Red Army, Trotsky gambled
on the assumption that the answer to his question would be a resounding no.
More controversial than the inclusion of peasants in the Red Army was the use of
“military specialists” or former Tsarist officers. In the wake of the October Revolution,
military officers were reviled as symbols of tsarist reaction. Workers were encouraged to
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elect their own officers and to dismiss commanders who were not receptive the new
forms of democratic military organization. As late as February 1918, Bolshevik leaders
were more concerned with getting rid of the old officer corps than putting them to work.
Party militants pointed to the examples of the abortive Kornilov putsch in 1917 and to the
nascent Volunteer Army as evidence that veteran officers were politically unreliable;
these officers were direct threats to the gains of the Revolution. Members of the old
General Staff who had remained at their posts were ignored, even as German forces
threatened to overrun Petrograd. To ensure that officers could no longer “tyrannize” the
rank-and-file soldier within the first months of Bolshevik power, disciplinary measures
such as corporal punishment were effectively banned. Recognizing the need for trained
specialists to lead the new volunteer-based Red Army, party stalwarts called for the
training of new officers from proper class backgrounds. To fulfill this growing need,
special military schools were established to educate men with the proper class
backgrounds in the art of leading men on the battlefield.
Trotsky recognized the necessity of utilizing the old officer corps. None of
Trotsky’s military policies attracted more fervent opposition within the party than his
advocacy of employing former officers as “military-specialists.” Trotsky began
campaigning for the inclusion of military-specialists in the new Red Army immediately
following his appointment to Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs. On 21 March 1918
he proclaimed, “before long every worker and peasant would undergoe military training
and officers and non-commissioned officers of the old command corps’ would be made
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use of.”31 To prepare the way for a more conventional military order in which the old
officers would feel comfortable, Trotsky reversed Soviet policies on military discipline.
Within weeks of his appointment, he had ordered elected soldiers’ committees to disband,
and he had revoked their right to appoint officers. Commanders’ abilities to punish their
soldiers were restored, as was corporal punishment and even the death penalty for serious
disciplinary offenses. Special “revolutionary military tribunals” were also established to
ensure soldiers actively complied with the harsh new policies.
Many within the party were appalled by Trotsky’s swift change of course on
military affairs. Despite Lenin’s support and the backing of the Central Executive
Committee, and even the Council of People’s Commissars, Trotsky had to placate
opponents of his policy. To assuage growing concerns surrounding party control of the
nascent Red Army, he expanded the jurisdiction of the political commissars. Two
political commissars would operate in each unit down to the company level, overseeing
the conduct of all military-specialists. For a military order to be valid, it would have to
have the signature of both the commanding officer and a political commissar. In practice,
this created a regime of dual-control or dvoenachalie in Red Army units where two
separate sources of authority would have to agree before operations could be carried out.
Whatever deleterious effects this may have had on operational capacities, it was probably
the only way to appease the party rank-and-file’s growing discontent with Trotsky’s
military policy. According to Von Hagen, “by reforming and expanding the institution of
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the political commissar… Sovnarkom recognized revolutionaries’ demands that mass
organizations keep tight control over the military apparatus.”32
Late in summer 1918, the scene was set for what Richard Pipes has called, “the
most devastating event in that country’s history since the Mongol invasions in the
thirteenth century.”33 Trotsky had ascended to the command of the Red Army in the wake
of a humiliating peace treaty with Germany; he had few effective forces under his
control. To make matters worse, he faced foreign and domestic threats that would have
put even the most experienced commanders to the test. He rose to the challenge by
balancing party orthodoxy against the exigencies of civil war. 1918 saw numerous threats
to Trotsky’s military formulae, 1919 would be no different.
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Ch. Two--- Trotsky and the Red Army, Late 1918 to November 1919
“Before the gates of Kazan stand the workers’ and peasants’ regiments of the Red Army.
They know what their task is: to prevent the enemy from taking a single step forward; to
wrest Kazan from his grasp; to throw back the Czech mercenaries and the officer thugs,
drown them in the Volga, and crush their criminal mutiny against the workers’
revolution.”- Trotsky August 191834

On 8 August 1918 Trotsky’s armored train halted at the Sviiazshk railway station.
Fifteen miles away lay Kazan, the strategic gateway to the Volga that had fallen to a
combined force of Czechoslovaks and soldiers of the Komuch government the day
before. Trotsky arrived to take charge of the Red Army forces in the wake of the Soviets’
most important military defeat to date. Following the Czechoslovak revolt in May 1918,
it was assumed by some leading Bolsheviks that the Czechoslovaks would fight their way
east towards the port of Vladivostok; many legionnaires were already east of the Urals.
Subsequent battles in the Volga region had undermined their assumption. By 8 August,
most of the Volga region had been lost to the Czechoslovaks and Komuch. The Red
Army’s defeat might shake Bolshevik power further westwards. By rail the Bolshevik
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capital at Moscow was just a few days from the front. The Czechoslovak Legion was
more potent than existing Bolshevik forces. If more of the legionnaires joined their
comrades on the Volga, the threat to Moscow would be grave.
The presence in Kazan of Komuch forces, known as the People’s Army
(Narodnaia Armiya), further jeopardized matters. Under the command of the capable
V.O. Kappel, contingents of the People’s Army had played a key role at Kazan. The
Komuch government at Samara was led by Socialist-Revolutionaries believed to have
close ties to the Volga peasantry. Komuch flew the red flag and advocated a radical
program of land redistribution and social justice while renouncing the Bolshevik
dictatorship. The historian Evan Mawdsley noted: “Unlike the counter-revolutionaries of
1919 and 1920, who were mostly army officers of conservative or reactionary views,
Komuch claimed to oppose the Bolshevik government in the name of the people.”35 The
alternative of radicalism without repression threatened key elements of Bolshevik
support.
Fortunately for Trotsky, the Bolsheviks enjoyed a number of advantages. At the
beginning of August 1918, the Red Army had shifted four separate army groups to the
Eastern Front (First Army, Third Army, Fourth Army, and Fifth Army). Despite the Red
Army’s presence, their June attempt to conscript the peasants of the Volga had failed.
Still, the organizational structure of the new army groups provided the Bolsheviks with a
crucial advantage. Reliable soldiers were swiftly diverted to the eastern army groups
from other regions. Czechoslovak-Komuch forces struggled to field fully equipped units
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across a broad front from Kazan to Samara. While their enemies struggled, the
Bolsheviks prepared to field four separate groups to strike at their foes’ exposed front.
At Kazan Trotsky benefitted from the presence of two of the Bolsheviks’ most
capable commanders: Ioakim Vatsetis and Mikhail Tukhachevsky. Vatsetis was a rare
find; he was both a gifted colonel with combat experience and the son of a worker. His
leadership during the earlier defense of Kazan transformed what should have been an
easy White victory into a bloody two-day engagement. Tukhachevksy was only twentyfive years old, but was a brilliant military tactician who had quickly proved his worth as
commander of the First Army on the Volga. Trotsky had a weak grasp of tactics but
could rely on these men for assistance. What Trotsky could not contribute tactically, he
made up for with his ability to alternately inspire and discipline the troops. For the troops
of the Fifth Army, nothing was more inspiring than the provisions Trotsky delivered
straight to the front. For weeks Red Army soldiers had fought in difficult conditions and
had endured shortages of food and ammunition. Trotsky’s train was filled with all manner
of goods that restored the troops’ spirits. As Lincoln observed: “Trotsky produced boots
for the barefooted, tobacco, medicines, watches, food, even field glasses and machine
guns, to raise the morale of Red Army fighting men at critical points along the front.”36
Trotsky’s willingness to put himself in the line of fire while he delivered supplies further
impressed the men on the line. Many Red Army soldiers had never seen a high-ranking
member of the Bolshevik government.
Of greater import was the transfer during the month of August of 30,000 fresh
troops to the Volga front. Earlier Trotsky had sided with the head of the Bolsheviks’
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General Staff, General Bonch-Bruevich, by recommending that these reinforcements
remain stationed on the western periphery to guard against a possible German attack.
Lenin’s intervention secured the troops’ redeployment eastwards. Many of the fresh
troops were active Bolsheviks or radical sympathizers recruited from the industrial areas
of central Russia. These men had volunteered for Red Army duty during early 1918.
Trotsky directed a torrent of revolutionary propaganda at the sympathetic soldiers which
may have helped to boost morale. On board Trotsky’s armored train was a printing press
he used to publish daily broadsides and rally the Bolshevik faithful. Trotsky wrote of his
propaganda efforts at Kazan: “In this conflict we are using not only rifles, cannon, and
machine guns, but also newspapers. For the newspaper is also a weapon. The newspaper
binds together all units of the Fifth Army in one thought, one aspiration, one will.”37
Trotsky also made frequent use of the gun and the lash. By the time he had
arrived at the front, army discipline had collapsed. During the retreat from Kazan several
units of the Fifth Army had defected en masse to the Czechoslovak-Komuch forces. Even
part of Colonel Vatsetis’ headquarters staff had switched sides; Vatsetis barely escaped
the city with his life. Trotsky set about restoring discipline. He accosted units that had
ceased to maintain battle discipline. He organized fresh reinforcements for the weak
Volga Naval Flotilla, allowing the Bolsheviks to regain naval supremacy. When men
from the flotilla invited women on board and could not clearly identify who was in
charge, Trotsky berated them: “Comrade sailors! This state of affairs is intolerable…
When there is no proper order at the center there can be no solid, vigorous work done on
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the vessels, either. And we are waging a serious struggle, a great struggle, truly a fight to
the death.”38
Trotsky’s attempts to restore discipline included violent reprisals. On 28 August
1918 the Komuch commander Kappel launched a surprise attack against Trotsky’s
encampment at Sviiazshk. The fighting occurred in the immediate vicinity of Trotsky’s
train. During the course of the battle, a Fifth Army detachment panicked and fled from
combat. Trotsky was saved when the Komuch troops were beaten back; Kazan was now
open to a Red Army counterattack. Even in victory, Trotsky did not forget about the Red
Army troops who had retreated without orders. After the battle was over, he issued death
sentences for the unit’s commanders, and resorted to the practice of decimation for the
men in the ranks: every tenth enlisted man was shot as a traitor to discourage future
indiscipline. Pipes wrote of the incident: “The first known instance of mass execution of
troops occurred on Trotsky’s orders and with Lenin’s approval at the end of August 1918
on the Eastern front, when the principle of ‘decimation’ was applied and 20 men were
shot, among them the regimental commander and commissar.”39 Trotsky publicized the
incident to the whole of the Red Army. In this pronouncement he declared: “The fate of
the working class is at stake. The brave and honorable soldier cannot give his life twicefor himself and for a deserter… Every honorable soldier and sailor will read the sentence
of the court with complete satisfaction. No quarter must be given to traitors to the
workers’ cause”40
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The Red Army retook Kazan on 10 September 1918. Two days later,
Tukhachevsky’s First Army retook the Volga city of Simbirsk. The Czechoslovak forces
west of the Urals now retreated to the east. Without Czechoslovak assistance, the
Komuch government offered only token resistance to the Red Army. On 7 October their
capital at Samara fell to the Fourth Red Army. The fall of Komuch marked the end of the
only serious democratic-socialist alternative to Bolshevik rule. Historians such as Evan
Mawdsley have described the Kazan campaign as a turning point in the Russian Civil
War. It helped Trotsky make the case for using regular officers to the rest of the party. He
had witnessed former tsarist officers operating in a formal military structure decisively
defeat the enemy. His support for more traditional forms of military organization was
further bolstered.
Trotsky spoke of a “breathing space” after the battles on the Volga. He expected a
temporary lull in combat operations during the winter. He also hoped the victory at
Kazan would silence his party critics who were displeased with his conduct as Army
Commissar. Trotsky was disappointed; over the winter of 1918-1919 security threats on
the Southern and Eastern fronts appeared that were in many ways graver than past
dangers. Similarly, over the winter dissension within the party over Trotsky’s Red Army
policies coalesced before erupting at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919.
Following the Czechoslovak Legion’s revolt early in the summer of 1918, the best
Red Army troops and officers were shifted from the Southern and Western Fronts to the
east. This permitted the battered Volunteer Army in the south of Russia to regroup and
expand. Following the death of General Kornilov in April, General Anton Denikin rose to
command the Volunteers. Denikin immediately asked Russia’s former wartime allies for
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help that resulted in millions of tons worth of arms shipments in 1919. He also regrouped
and rearmed those units that had survived Red Army offensives in spring 1918. By June,
Denikin’s Volunteers had swollen to 9,000 men-at-arms; he decided to renew offensive
operations. By July 1918 Denikin had driven the Bolsheviks from the lands of the Kuban
Cossacks and threatened the Red Army’s routes to the Caucasus.
As the Volunteer Army drove the Red Army from the north Caucasus, General
Pyotr Krasnov (the new ataman of the Don Host) rallied his Cossacks to resume
operations against the Bolsheviks. Krasnov relied on a massive influx of arms from the
German Army’s occupation force in Ukraine. From summer to December 1918 his troops
repeatedly threatened the strategically located city of Tsaritsyn on the southern Volga.
Denikin attempted to unite his forces with the Don Cossacks, but Krasnov refused to
subordinate his men to Denikin and publically endorsed the cause of independence for
the Don Host. By January 1919 Krasnov’s final attempts to take Tsaritsyn had been
defeated. The loss was a blessing in disguise for Denikin. Krasnov resigned in disgrace,
leaving Denikin free to assume control over a unified force of Volunteers and Don
Cossacks. By February 1919 the Bolsheviks faced a well-led, increasingly well-armed
opposition on the Southern Front.
As Denikin rebuilt the Volunteers in the south, Admiral Kolchak rallied his antiBolshevik forces in Siberia. Following the Czechoslovak uprising in the summer of 1918,
an anti-Bolshevik “Directorate” of moderate socialists and liberals established itself at
Omsk. Former tsarist officials and officers who were uncomfortable with the Komuch
government flocked to Omsk. The Directorate government proved ineffectual. Festering
discontent with the Directorate resulted in a military coup on the night of 17-18
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November 1918. It is unclear what role Kolchak played in the seizure of power, but the
result was a military dictatorship with Kolchak as supreme ruler. Pipes recorded one
popular interpretation of the events: “The Council of Ministers, which the Directory had
appointed… claimed authority on its own behalf and immediately consigned it to
Admiral Kolchak.”41
In early December, Kolchak set out to build a military force capable of
overthrowing the Communist regime. Many anti-Bolsheviks, both inside and outside of
Russia, saw Kolchak as the best hope for removing the Bolsheviks from power. The
British General Alfred Knox lobbied his government to support Kolchak. Kolchak was
rewarded with money, arms, and even the presence of two British army battalions at his
capital in Omsk. Pipes recorded the generous assistance: “Between October 1918 and
October 1919, Britain sent to Omsk 97,000 tons of supplies, including 600,000 rifles, 6,
831, machine guns, and over 200,000 uniforms.”42 With this help, by the end of the year
Kolchak was able to field a (for the time) well-equipped fighting force of over 150,000 at
combat strength. Trotsky and the Red Army were completely unprepared for such an
unforeseen threat. Following their victory over the Komuch forces in October, the Red
Army had overextended itself in a risky gambit to secure the Urals before the full onset of
the Russian winter.
In December 1918 Kolchak’s fresh troops surprised the exhausted left flank of the
Bolsheviks’ Eastern Front Group. After October the High Command, including Trotsky,
had seen the Eastern Front as less of a priority. Resources had been shifted to the
Southern and Southwestern Fronts. It did not take long for Kolchak to expose this
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mistake. The White counterattack forced the Third Army to retreat 190 miles from the
Urals. By 25 December 1918 Kolchak’s forces had captured the important urban center at
Perm.
The winter’s temporary respite in fighting brought no relief to Trotsky politically.
The Reds’ exultant triumphalism in October 1918 gave way to outrage and panic almost
overnight. Five days after the defeat at Perm, the party’s most important organ in the
region, the Ural obkom (Uralskyi Oblastnoi Komitet), released a report highly critical of
the center’s (i.e. Trotsky’s) handling of military policy in the Urals. Mark Von Hagen
noted that the report, “drew alarmed attention ‘to the predominance of mediocre old
officers or outright White Guardists’ and demanded, “account for the bitter experience of
the defeats suffered, and a radical reevaluation by the party on an all-Russian scale of the
methods of building the Red Army.”43 Trotsky attempted to brush off the outcry: “The
criticism expressed in the resolution from the Urals Regional Committee is abstract,
fortuitous, and shapeless in character, and amounts--- if the Committee will pardon my
saying so--- to a mild grumble.”44
Many felt otherwise. The Bolshevik Central Committee took the accusations by
the Urals obkom very seriously. A commission led by Josef Stalin and Feliks
Dzerzhinsky was charged with investigating the obkom’s complaints. Neither man was a
friend of Trotsky. Dzerzhinsky and Trotsky had clashed over the authority that
Dzerzhinsky’s Cheka secret police could wield vis-à-vis the Red Army. Trotsky and
Stalin were openly hostile towards each other. During summer 1918 Stalin had usurped
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control over the defense of Tsaritsyn. Along with the communists-turned-Red Army men
Mikhail Frunze and Klimenty Voroshilov, as well as the future ‘Red Cavalry’
commander Semyon Budyennyi, Stalin had disobeyed Trotsky’s dictates from the center.
Voroshilov and Budyennyi especially combined fierce opposition to the “military
specialists” with a personal loyalty to Stalin that would later play an important role in the
early political history of the Soviet Union. Stalin’s and Dzerzhinsky’s commission sided
with the Ural obkom as expected. Von Hagen summarized the findings: “Harsh criticism
was leveled against Trotsky’s overreliance on military specialists… The commission
agreed that party members and commissars exerted little or no influence over military
specialists. Officers not only interfered with party work but had been known to arrest
chairmen of party committees and comrades’ courts.”45
The commission’s findings set the stage for a bitter fight over the direction of
Army policy at the 8th Congress of the Bolshevik Party in March 1919. Trotsky was not
unaware of the growing political uncertainty surrounding his choice of military policy.
He submitted a set of “XIX Theses” to the Bolshevik Central Committee in February
1919 in an attempt to head off further attacks on his organization of the Red Army. He
knew he could count on majority support in the powerful Central Committee, and
attempted to use this support to his advantage. Still, he was aware that he would have to
tread lightly if he was to avoid an open confrontation with Grigory Zinoviev, Stalin, and
Dzerzhinsky, who were likely to oppose him no matter what. The result of the
disagreement was a delicate compromise that paid lip-service to many of the policies of
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his opponents as “future goals” while insisting on his current course as necessary to
ensure victory in the Civil War.
Trotsky began his theses by identifying the ideas of a “people’s militia”, guerrilla
warfare, and elected commanders as the legacy of petty-bourgeois “Kautskyism.” He
declared: “When the class struggle has been transformed into open civil war, tearing
away the veil of bourgeois law and bourgeois-democratic institutions, the slogan of a
‘people’s militia’ loses all its meaning… and so becomes a weapon for reaction.”46 He
called the opposition’s demands to implement a militia system now misguided at best,
and bourgeois philistinism at worst. What was needed now, he claimed was a military
program that would guarantee a Red victory, by any means necessary. Harsh discipline,
“barracks” life for soldiers, conscription etc. were to be viewed as “temporary measures”
only, put in place to ensure that the nascent Bolshevik state emerged victorious in war.
The inconsistency between proclaiming workers’ liberty and self-determination while
subjecting workers to corporal discipline at the hands of former tsarist officers was not
lost on any conscientious Bolshevik. Trotsky admitted: “These contradictions were not
accidental deviations, but resulted from the actual circumstances and constituted quite
unavoidable transitional forms in the work of creating the army in the concrete conditions
which had been bequeathed to us by the imperialist war and the bourgeois (February)
revolution.”47
After painting this picture of the military opposition, Trotsky continued to defend
the more controversial aspects of Red Army administration. Communists should play a
larger role in the armed forces, he said, but only as purveyors of Bolshevik ideals. There
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was no room within the army for an autonomous party organization. Bolsheviks should
instead work towards increasing the number of Communists directly integrated into the
ranks as an inspiration to the less politically conscious soldiers. Similarly, commissars
could best serve the cause by focusing more attention on the political purity of the army.
Trotsky argued it would be a disservice to the Bolsheviks if commissars attempted to
assume more responsibility for military matters. This would be a distraction from their
mission as “bearers of the spirit of our Party.” Trotsky did not attempt to defend Red
Army disciplinary policies as reflective of Bolshevik ideology. He merely stated that they
were transitional and would soon pass away. Lastly, Trotsky denied there were any
grounds to attack the military specialists “on principle.” He repeatedly insisted that it was
essential to the Red Army’s revolutionary character that its conscripts be either poor
peasants or workers. Yet class background no longer seemed to matter when it came to
the officers calling the shots.
Ultimately, Trotsky’s argument hinged on an appeal not to the consistency of his
policies with Bolshevik principles, but to the nature of the regime he was serving. Since
the Bolsheviks were the representatives of the proletarian class in power, it followed that
they would eventually embody the political ideals of that “class,” regardless of the shortterm reality. Trotsky said: “The revolutionary character of the army is determined above
all, by the character of the Soviet regime which creates this army, which sets its aims and
makes it, so to speak, its instrument.”48 He elaborated: “Counter-revolution cannot in any
way develop out of the regime of proletarian dictatorship; it can establish itself only as a
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result of a direct and open bloody victory over this regime.”49 The “universal militia” and
“democratic army” could exist, but only in the future. For now Bolsheviks must content
themselves with repressive, hierarchical forms of organization. In late February 1919 the
Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party adopted Trotsky’s “XIX Theses”, but many in
the Party were still not satisfied.
At the 8th Party Congress, opposition to Trotsky’s management of the Red Army
coalesced into two camps. The first camp was composed of “moderate” Bolsheviks who
worried about insufficient party control over the army. Members of this camp included
Mikhail Lashevich, Klimenty Voroshilov, and the well-known Central Committee
members Stalin, Dzerzhinsky, and Zinoviev. These men did not take issue with the need
for “iron discipline” in the army, nor did they endorse a return to more democratic forms
of military organization. Their demands can be boiled down to three main points: a
reduction in status of “military specialists” to a more consultative role; increased control
for commissars over operational matters; and autonomy for party cells within the
organizational framework of the Red Army. These men were particularly incensed by
what they saw as gross abuses of power by the military specialists. The military
specialists hailed from bourgeois class backgrounds and were proponents of counterrevolutionary ideals. Their presence in a nominally revolutionary army that was already
dangerously full of non-proletarian elements (i.e. the peasantry) could only have a
deleterious effect on the socialist character of the regime. The scholar Francesco
Benvenuti observed: “Those like Stalin, even though they refrained from voicing broad
political formulations of an alternative nature, nonetheless viewed official military policy
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as an unjustifiable means of reinstating men, ideas, and methods that had not been born
of the revolution.”50
The frequency with which “military specialists” had defected to the enemy in the
line of fire was cited as evidence for their dubious loyalty. In the spring of 1919 mass
desertions from the Red Army continued unabated. Richard Pipes puts the number of
deserters for February and March 1919 at over 80,000 Red Army men in uniform.51 To
counter the trend, this wing of the military opposition argued that it was imperative that
the commissars be given control over combat operations. If Communists controlled the
army, the toiling classes would be more likely to remain at their posts and to preserve
discipline. Von Hagen observed: “The Military Opposition contended that the
commissars deserved more than a narrow control function, because they already had
more combat experience than many military specialists.”52 It would also be necessary to
increase the importance of the party’s political departments (politotdely) in day-to-day
military operations. In the spring of 1919 politotdely responsibilities were limited to
selecting qualified commissars and disseminating propaganda amongst the troops. The
“moderate” opposition called for augmenting their powers to include sniffing out and
removing politically suspect “military specialists” from the army.
The “Left Communist” faction of the party was even more spirited in their
opposition to Trotsky’s administration of the Red Army. The “Left Communists”
considered the Red Army in its current form to be a betrayal of the Revolution. These
men and women saw the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power a signal to begin immediate
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construction of a Communist society grounded in egalitarian politics. Forced
conscription, military discipline, total warfare, and an authoritarian officer corps were all
relics of the “reactionary” tsarist past and had no place in a socialist society. The” Left
Communists” proudly affirmed their support for the democratic approach they associated
with the first phase of the Revolution. Robert Daniels described the dispute: “The essence
of issue was the same clash of anarchistic idealism and pragmatic predilection for
traditional organizational forms which divided the Left Communists and the Leninists in
respect to industrial and labor policy.”53
The “Left Communists” called for a top-down reversal of military policy. In
nearly all particulars their demands reiterated the Bolshevik platform prior to the seizure
of power in October 1917. Coercive disciplinary policies were to be abolished
immediately. The death penalty and other forms of corporal punishment were rejected as
repressive and inconsistent with socialism. Officers must be elected by the soldiers under
their command. Officers would be subject to recall at any time if their orders violated the
“spirit of Revolution” or otherwise offended their comrades-in-arms. Mandatory
conscription was to be promptly rejected in favor of an all-volunteer military. Measures
must be taken to transition to a “universal militia” whereby all citizens of the proper class
background would receive military training at their place of work. Barracks were to be
done away with forever, and men and women would be sent into battle alongside their
co-workers and neighbors. To top it off, traditional styles of warfare were to be
abandoned. In place of mass divisions and wide fronts, militia units would instead
operate in flying-squads and adopt guerilla tactics. Local party committees would
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coordinate the actions of their own militia units and play a major role in defining military
practice.
Despite his gifted oratory and administrative capacities, Trotsky was strongly
disliked by large segments of the party. Trotsky was not unaware of his lack of
popularity, and this probably played an important role in his decision to avoid the 8th
Congress. He excused himself by insisting he was needed at the Eastern Front, where
Kolchak was resuming his attack with great ferocity. In a risky move, Trotsky promoted a
Central Committee decision to order all Congress delegates from the party’s military
organizations also to return to the front. The party’s military organizations generally
opposed Trotsky’s line, and resented what they saw as an attempt to silence their dissent.
Benvenuti said of the incident: “Trotsky replied to this ‘interpretation’ during the
meeting, by referring to ‘the extremely serious situation’ that had arisen on the eastern
front.”54 Following the outcry from militants in the military, the Central Committee
reversed its decision and allowed the delegates from the fronts to attend. The 8th Party
Congress was the largest forum to-date for determining Bolshevik military policy.
Trotsky was absent; his opponents were there in full force.
The first sessions of the 8th Congress began in Moscow on 18 March 1919. More
than four hundred delegates attended, over forty of them served in the armed forces or the
party military organizations. Military matters occupied a prominent place on the
Congress’ agenda. The debate between supporters of Trotsky’s leadership and the
military opposition was initially conducted at an open session of the Congress on March
20. At Trotsky’s request, the party veteran Grigorii Sokolnikov spoke in favor of the
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official Red Army line. Vladimir Smirnov, a former Left Socialist Revolutionary and
“Left Communist”, spoke on behalf of Trotsky’s opponents. Smirnov mentioned widely
divergent criticisms of Trotsky.
Sokolnikov was the first to speak, he based his speech almost entirely on
Trotsky’s “XIX Theses”. Sokolnikov had the advantage of endorsing a coherent set of
policies. He also benefitted from the Central Committee’s explicit endorsement of
Trotsky’s theses less than a month earlier. Sokolnikov did not stray from Trotsky’s
strategies in the theses. He identified the use of military specialists, harsh discipline, and
conscription as the necessary means for winning a difficult war and preserving socialist
power. Communist power should be increased the army, but only within the existing
framework of Red Army protocol. This meant training more workers and peasants as
officers and increasing Bolshevik propaganda, but not doing away with military
specialists or limiting their powers.
A large part of Sokolnikov’s speech was devoted to a negative characterization of
the Left Communists’ platform within the wider military opposition. These Bolsheviks
were portrayed as advocates for a backwards, pre-modern style of partisan warfare that
would inevitably end in the destruction of the Bolshevik Party. Sokolnikov borrowed
directly from Trotsky’s claim that, “Preaching guerrillaism as a military program is
equivalent to advocating a reversion from large-scale industry to the handicraft system.
Such advocacy is fully in accordance with the nature of intellectual groups which are
incapable of wielding state power, incapable of seriously conceiving the task of wielding
this power, and which results in guerilla (polemical or terroristic) forays against the
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workers’ power.”55 Sokolnikov attempted to tar the opposition by imputing to it
Menshevik/Socialist-Revolutionary sympathies. Sokolnikov ended his speech in a
conciliatory fashion, promising after a Red victory to implement many of the
opposition’s more-democratic ideals. Benvenuti summarized: “Like the theses,
Sokolnikov concluded by deferring to a not-too-distant future: once ‘communist society’
was in a position to afford a ‘communist militia’, certain features of ‘partisan’
democratism could be ‘resuscitated’.”56
Smirnov’s speech was a delicate effort to focus the debate on those issues upon
which the military opposition agreed. He began by noting that opposition to military
specialists stemmed from the poor quality and dubious loyalty of many specialists. He
insisted this was reason enough for increasing the importance of the commissars.
Commissars should have their authority increased to include operational matters--- on top
of oversight and political duties. Smirnov was especially hostile to the harsh disciplinary
code prevailing in the army. He stressed that the current emphasis on coercion made it
difficult for peasant conscripts to differentiate between the old tsarist army and the new
socialist one. Especially egregious were those statutes that fixed relations between
enlisted men and officers, such as the provision that guaranteed officers separate living
quarters. Benvenuti condensed Smirnov’s argument: “Certainly statues were necessary,
but they should not give peasant soldiers the impression that they were still in the old
Imperial Army.”57 Lastly, Smirnov advocated greater autonomy and a broader role for
party organizations operating at the fronts.
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Following Smirnov’s speech, the debate was moved to a closed session at the
request of the Central Committee. The full minutes of this session were not made public
for decades. Behind closed doors many party members spoke out against the current
military policy of the War Commissariat, including Stalin. When a vote was held where
delegates were asked to choose between the rival camps of Trotsky and Smirnov, a
majority of delegates sided with the opposition. At this moment of heightened tension,
Lenin addressed the Congress and weighed in largely on the side of Trotsky. From here
the opposition splintered between those who wished to retain the gist of the War
Commissariat’s policies, and those who advocated a more radical set of “left” military
policies. In a moment of irony, Stalin and Zinoviev now found themselves defending
much of Trotsky’s program. Following this closed session, a special committee of three
Central Committee men and two representatives of the “military opposition” was created
to draft a compromise resolution.
On the face of it, the compromise was a victory for Trotsky’s position. The
resolution was set down in the theses format that was largely a modified form of
Trotsky’s original “XIX Theses”. Military specialists were retained, while the idea of a
militia was endorsed for the distant future. Harsh disciplinary measures were largely
preserved. Conscription was maintained over voluntary recruitment. Still, the resolution
criticized Trotsky. Commissars saw their powers augmented beyond anything Trotsky
had supported. In addition to their duties to counter-sign operational orders, commissars
were now given broad disciplinary powers--- including augmented powers of arrest.
Theoretically, this included the right to arrest military specialists of suspect loyalty
without clearing those decisions with higher-ups in the War Commissariat. High-ranking
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commissars were given control of the special sections (osobye otdely) responsible for
secret police functions in the army, a role previously reserved for members of the Cheka.
Of equal importance was the decision to recommend future revision of the service
regulations of the Red Army, including those provisions pertaining to relations between
officers and the rank-and-file. Lastly, decision-making in the Bolsheviks’ political
organizations within the Red Army was shifted from front commands to the army and
divisional level. In practice, this made it harder for the center to impose its own
“pragmatic” perspective on its military operatives. Also, the resolution called for the
holding of periodic conferences for party members at the front where questions of
military policy could be discussed. In keeping with the devolution of power to divisional
organizations, local party members would now have a greater say on military matters.
This would bring more opportunities to criticize Trotsky’s “reactionary” policies for
those party members serving in the armed forces.
Trotsky was absent from the Congress, but he closely followed its proceedings.
The Congress came to an end on 23 March 1919. Trotsky’s response was swift. On 25
March he wrote “To the communists of the Eastern Front” for the party newspaper
published onboard his armored train. In many ways the article was a direct rebuke of
party members in the military who questioned his authority. To quote the article at
length: “There were concentrations of Communists who saw it as one of their most
important tasks to criticize and condemn our military system, passing resolutions to this
effect, resolving that decorations are unnecessary, protesting against the internal service
regulations, and so on and so forth. This led in its turn to conflicts with those
Communists who conscientiously carried out the party’s policy. These conflicts then
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resulted in weakening internal relations and discipline, and had most pernicious
repercussions in all spheres of work, and consequently in the army’s combat capacity.”58
Between 26 and 31 March Trotsky responded directly to the Central Committee. With
regards to a reformulation of service regulations, he called for Smirnov himself to outline
concrete alternatives. He accused those who protested against the military specialists of
being slovenly and ill-informed. He firmly rejected a call for relaxing army discipline, as
well as any attempts to guarantee communists serving in the military autonomy from
their commanding officers or other special privileges.
The 8th Congress was supposed to resolve outstanding disputes between Trotsky’s
supporters and his opponents. For awhile the grave military situation at the front largely
ensured this was a reality. On 6 March 1919 Admiral Kolchak’s forces resumed their
offensive in the Urals. The Red Armies on this front were caught completely off guard.
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Armies arrayed against the Kolchak in the
East had failed to rest and resupply over the two months since they were attacked. In fact,
valuable troops and supplies had actually been diverted to the Southern and Southwestern
fronts. As Trotsky said at the time: “On the other side, after our successes on the Volga,
the central Soviet government concentrated all attention on the Southern front, to which
strong units were sent from the Eastern front, while experienced, energetic leaders were
also transferred thither. The result was that our front in the East was weakened.”59 Within
a week the decision to divert forces from the east was exposed as a strategic blunder. On
13 March Kolchak’s armies took the important city of Ufa in the western Urals. Trotsky
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had scarcely exaggerated the threat when he cited the emergency on the Eastern Front as
grounds to recuse himself from the Congress.
For nearly a month and a half, the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat.
Trotsky’s frequent presence at the fronts proved insufficient to halt the rout. Soviet
control of the Volga was once again in jeopardy. Lincoln outlined the setbacks: “By the
middle of April, the Whites had driven a wedge more than a hundred miles wide between
the Fifth and Second Red Armies… Their advance units stood less than sixty miles from
Samara, less than seventy from Simbirsk, and a mere fifty-six miles from Kazan.”60 Even
Lenin and Trotsky found it hard not to panic: each made frequent reference to the grave
danger posed by Kolchak’s forces while reccomending drastic solutions. Some of the
extreme measures taken to combat the situation at the front made Trotsky uneasy. His
conflict at the Congress with party members in the military had not been forgotten.
During the week of the Congress Trotsky had directly attacked Communists serving on
the Eastern Front, saying, “We must seek in the work of the Communists one of the
reasons for the setbacks that have befallen us.”61 The majority of the Central Committee
did not share in his lack of enthusiasm for the Communists at the fronts. During March
and April thousands of Bolshevik Party members were specially drafted for service in the
fight against Kolchak. Lincoln observed: “Before the end of May, some twenty thousand
Bolshevik Party members and another sixty thousands elite workers had been sent to the
East. The newly organized Komsomol (Kommunisticheskyi Soyuz Molodezhi), the
Communist Youth League, sent three thousand of its best members.”62 The heightened
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role of Communists in active service promoted tension between party activists and
“military specialists.” Party members continuously blamed the specialists for the setbacks
that befell the Red Army in spring and summer 1919.
Tensions continued to escalate with the April appointment of Mikhail Frunze as
commander of the First, Fourth and Fifth Armies on the Eastern Front. The decision was
made in spite of Trotsky’s wishes. As party militants ascended through the ranks,
“military specialists” with ample combat experience were relieved of command, or even
arrested. Trotsky opposed the new course, but with diminishing success. He wrote in
summer 1919: “Those who are concerned first and foremost in this matter are the
overwhelming majority of the honourable commanders. This majority, who already have
rendered so many services to the Soviet country to their credit, will not allow isolated
scoundrels to drive their poisoned splinters into the body of our army and spread panicky
suspicion of the commanding apparatus as a whole.”63 By April the purges were severe
enough to merit Vatsetis writing directly to Lenin to complain: “Every commissar has his
secret desire to catch our staff officers out in some counter-revolutionary attitude or
treachery. This seems a very strange way to behave, since that sort of behavior was a
typical feature of the gendarmes of the old regime.”64
Frunze proved to be a gifted military commander, beyond the talents of many
other Bolshevik loyalists turned officers. Within a week of his appointment, Frunze had
halted Kolchak’s advances. The White forces began to overstretch their lines of supply
and communication. On 28 April 1919 Frunze ordered his forces to go over to the
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offensive against Kolchak. The month of May saw Kolchak mount a vain effort to
contain the advancing Red Army. The offensive on the Eastern Front marked the rise of
dozens of Bolshevik military heroes, including Vasilii Chapaev and the future hero of
Stalingrad and Berlin--- Vasilii Chuikov. On 9 June forces commanded by Chapaev
occupied Ufa. Kolchak would never again pose a serious threat to the Red Army. The
White threat from the East was all but eliminated on the western side of the Urals. The
Red Army retook Kolchak’s capital at Omsk on 14 November 1919.
The victories of the Red Army in the eastern theater were accompanied by a
deterioration of the situation in the south. As Chapaev’s men stormed Ufa, Denikin’s
Volunteer Army was busy driving the last of the Bolsheviks from the North Caucasus. In
late spring and early summer Denikin added two new groups: Baron Pyotr Wrangel’s
Caucasus Army, and the Don Cossacks (who replaced Krasnov as ataman with the more
receptive General Sidorin in February). During the last two weeks of June, Denikin’s
men launched a renewed offensive that resulted in the complete collapse of the Red
Army’s Southern Front. On 30 June 1919 both Kharkov and Tsaritsyn fell to the
Volunteers. Denikin’s men threatened to press their victories with a three-pronged attack
aimed at the heart of Bolshevik-held Central Russia.
Denikin’s victories led to full-fledged panic at the highest levels of the Red Army
and the Bolshevik Party. They also fueled a heated dispute that resulted in one of
Trotsky’s most humiliating defeats during the Civil War period. Alarmed by the growing
threat in the south, Trotsky and his allies in the Red Army high command (including
Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis) called for an immediate halt to Frunze’s offensive in the
Urals. They argued that the advance should stop at Ufa, where Kolchak would be

63

contained until the spring of 1920. The bulk of the Red Army’s resources would instead
be transferred to the south where they would confront the Volunteer Army and head off
an attack on the Bolsheviks’ industrial heartland. This argument was generally supported
by a majority of the “military specialists” in the upper ranks of the Red Army high
command. Trotsky summarized his view of the situation at the end of June: “After a few
weeks there will be a decisive turn on the Southern front. In these transitional weeks all
forces and resources must be put at the service of the troops on the Southern front.”65
This view was hotly contested by a majority of the Bolshevik Central Committee
and a majority of prominent Communist-military officers. Without denying the gravity of
events in the south, Sergei Kamenev and Mikhail Frunze argued that a halt to the
offensive in the Urals would be tantamount to defeatism. Political heavyweights such as
Stalin, Zinoviev, and Lenin supported Kamenev’s and Frunze’s proposals. The situation
was not without bitter political overtones. During the spring of 1919 Trotsky had replaced
Kamenev as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Front with the ineffectual tsarist officer
General Samoilov. Samoilov proved completely inept. So Trotsky was forced to agree to
Kamenev’s reinstatement at the end of June 1919. The first real shots in the dispute were
fired in Petrograd by Stalin himself. Stalin had been sent to take command of the city’s
defenses in May 1919. A revolt by part of the city’s garrison on 13 June 1919 was met
with the most vicious terror. Stalin attributed the revolt to collaboration between the
garrison’s “military specialist” officers and British naval units operating in the Gulf of
Finland. Stalin returned to Moscow at the beginning of June 1919 intent on exposing the
growing treachery of “military specialists” while undermining Trotsky politically.
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The growing party infighting signaled a return to the open dispute between Stalin
and Trotsky over “military specialists” that had last surfaced in summer 1918. In that
episode Trotsky had successfully defended his argument for officers’ superiority and
Stalin had been dismissed from his command of Tsaritsyn’s defense. This time Stalin was
to gain the upper hand politically. Stalin seized on the growing dispute over strategy in
the east to urge that Vatsetis be replaced as Commander-in-Chief of all Red Army forces
by his rival (and Trotsky’s opponent), Kamenev. Stalin drew special attention to
Trotsky’s close ties to previously inept tsarist officers (i.e. Samoilov) as further evidence
why Vatsetis’ cautious strategy was inappropriate and as evidence of Trotsky’s possible
political duplicity. On 3 July 1919 Stalin convinced a majority of the Central Committee
to dismiss Vatsetis as Commander-in-Chief and to replace him with Kamenev. At the
same time, Vatsetis and three of Trotsky’s allies were dismissed from the Revolutionary
Military Council. Kamenev and three other Stalin allies replaced them. Lincoln observed:
“As commissar for war Trotsky remained the council’s chairman, but Stalin’s allies could
outvote him by a margin of two to one.”66 Just to make sure Trotsky had no lingering
doubts about who was running the show, Vatsetis was arrested not long after his
dismissal for leading a “White-guardist organization.” When evidence for such absurd
claims against a prominent military hero of the Revolution were not forthcoming, the
charges were dropped, but Stalin had sent his message. Trotsky’s military specialists
would now be subject to humiliation, arrest, or worse if they failed to show sufficient
deference to Stalin.
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Trotsky lost no time in disputing Kamenev’s new war plan. While Kamenev
conceded the importance of concentrating the bulk of the Red Army’s resources on the
Southern Front, he disagreed with Trotsky on how these forces should be positioned.
Kamenev argued for utilizing the select Ninth and Tenth Armies to direct the bulk of the
Red Army counterattack down the Volga towards Tsaritsyn. From there the Red Army
could split the Novocherkassk-Rostov rail lines and deny Denikin crucial supplies from
his allies abroad. Trotsky argued such an attack would put Red forces at the mercy of the
anti-Communist population of the Don region. Trotsky proposed to conduct the main
counterattack in Donbas around Kharkov, a region with an industrial population more
sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, but also a much higher concentration of enemy units.
Lincoln condensed this argument: “The advantage of operating in territory inhabited by a
friendly population, with a dense network of roads and railways to bring in
reinforcements, ammunition, and weapons, Trotsky insisted, would more than offset the
difficulties of attacking Denikin’s stronger center rather than his weaker flank.”67 On 5
July 1919 the Central Committee voted to endorse Kamenev’s directives; a furious
Trotsky offered to resign his posts in protest. Only Lenin’s decisive intervention
prevented the Committee from accepting Trotsky’s resignation; Lenin personally
convinced him to remain in charge of the Red Army.
Events proved Trotsky correct. By mid-August the 50,000 strong Ninth and Tenth
Armies launched their counterattack down the Volga only to be halted by troops fighting
under Baron Wrangel. Just as the Red Army launched its counterattack on the Volga, the
Don Cossack General Mamontov was launching a daring cavalry raid behind Red Army
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lines, beginning a forty-day reign of terror that resulted in the sacking of Tambov and
Voronezh. As Mamontov’s raid wrapped up in September, the Red Army offensive
ground to a halt outside of Tsaritsyn. Trotsky’s strategy was vindicated, yet he was
embarrassed by his refusal to support a significant cavalry force for the Red Army.
Trotsky had earlier attacked the cavalry as a legacy of the aristocratic classes that was
incompatible with “proletarian” forms of warfare. A lack of cavalry had severely
inhibited the Red Army’s ability to defend against Mamontov’s fast-moving raiders. To
his credit, Trotsky realized his error and promptly began to rally support for a Red Army
cavalry force. On 1 September 1919 Trotsky proclaimed: “All that is needed is that the
creation of a cavalry force should become a task for the working masses. It is necessary
that the proletariat grasp the importance for the cause of the revolution of this new step
forward. The Soviet Republic needs cavalry. Red cavalrymen, forward! To horse,
proletarians!”68 As a result, Stalin’s military ally Semyon Budyonnyi rapidly assembled
the First Red Cavalry, which would go on to play a decisive role in Red Army victories
by late October.
Just as the Red Army reversed course on the use of cavalry, so too did it redirect
its forces to counter the Volunteers’ main attack from the Donbas. At the end of
September, Denikin’s Volunteers captured the city of Orel in the Bolsheviks’ heartland.
Denikin was now just 220 miles away from Moscow. As if things could not get any
worse, a new and dangerous threat unexpectedly formed on the Bolsheviks’ Northwestern
periphery. Throughout 1919 British naval units had hounded the Bolsheviks’ meager
Baltic fleet around Petrograd, even sinking a few Bolshevik vessels. They had also
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applied steady pressure to anti-Communist Russian exiles in the newly independent
Baltic states to unite their forces and march on Petrograd. By fall 1919 their efforts were
beginning to bear fruit. In August 1919 the counterrevolutionary General Nikolai
Yudenich helped organize the anti-Bolshevik “Northwestern Government” in
independent Estonia. By September he had rallied over 17,000 men to serve under his
banner and had solicited numerous arms and supplies from his British allies.
On 28 September 1919 Yudenich’s forces crossed the Estonian border and went
over to the offensive against the Bolsheviks. In less than a week, Yudenich cut the rail
line between Pskov and Petrograd, opening a clear path to Petrograd. Leading Bolsheviks
had failed to reckon on an unexpected assault on their northwestern periphery. The
Central Committee and Red Army high command panicked: even Lenin called on the
party to evacuate its forces from Petrograd. At this point, a surprising alliance between
Stalin and Trotsky intervened to restore confidence in the startled Bolshevik ranks. Both
men stressed the grave political consequences of abandoning the city that had given birth
to the February and October Revolutions. Trotsky himself asked to depart immediately
for the Petrograd front to assume command of its defenses. On 16 October Trotsky
rushed by rail to Petrograd, just as Yudenich’s forces were occupying the Petrograd
suburb of Gatchina. En route to Petrograd, Trotsky summoned the city’s workers to
battle: “Get ready, Petrograd! More than once have October days been great days in your
history. Destiny summons you to write during this October a fresh and perhaps most
glorious page in the history of the proletarian struggle.”69
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It is impossible objectively to assess the effect of Trotsky’s presence at the front.
Disciples of Trotsky have described his role as decisive, as did the hagiographer Isaac
Deutscher: “On horseback Trotsky gathered terror-stricken and retreating men and led
them back to the fighting-line.”70 On 19 October 1919 Yudenich’s forces stormed the
Pulkovo Heights overlooking the city, as Trotsky addressed the same Petrograd Soviet he
had presided over in 1905 and 1917. His words stirred the hearts of Bolshevik faithful,
and are worth quoting at length: “I shall not hide from you that I came here with a heart
full of anxiety…The city which has suffered so much, which has burned internally, which
has so often been subjected to dangers, which has never spared itself, which has stripped
itself so bare – this Red Petrograd is still what it was, the torchbearer of the revolution,
the rock of steel on which we shall build the church of the future. And, backed by the
combined forces of the whole country, we shall surrender this Petrograd to no-one.”71
If Trotsky’s words were effective, so to was the massive influx of reinforcements
flooding the city from Moscow by rail. Yudenich’s failure to cut the rail-link to the
Bolshevik capital was a critical mistake. His offensive collapsed as rapidly as it had
mounted. On 21 October a reinvigorated Bolshevik force drove Yudenich from the
Pulkovo Heights, beginning a counterattack that would not halt until the Red Army had
driven the enemy to Estonia and completely destroyed Yudenich’s Northwestern Army.
On 7 November 1919, the second anniversary of the Revolution, Trotsky returned to
Moscow personally to report the victory in Petrograd to an overjoyed Central Committee.
Trotsky’s three weeks in Petrograd had witnessed equally momentous victories on the
Southern Front. If Trotsky’s command of Petrograd’s defense was one of his finest
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personal triumphs, he could also claim some credit for the recent victories against
Denikin in the south. Denikin’s seemingly unstoppable advance towards Moscow,
combined with the failure of Kamenev’s strategy to make serious progress on the Volga,
led the Central Committee to reevaluate its plan. In October 1919 the Central Committee
reversed its decision and endorsed a plan backed by Trotsky. The Red Army would now
divide its counterattack into two main wedges. One force would attack at Denikin’s left
flank in the Ukraine while the other group continued Kamenev’s earlier attack down the
Volga. A major victory by Budyennyi’s Red Cavalry at Voronezh on 24 October forced
Denikin’s forward units to retreat, signaling the first of many reversals for the Volunteer
Army and the success of Trotsky’s strategy.
The second anniversary of the October Revolution also marked the little over a
year-and-a-half since Trotsky had risen to command the Red Army. He had transformed a
motley band of disorganized militia into a disciplined fighting force. Grave threats had
been beaten back on multiple fronts. Yet many questions remained unanswered. The
events of 1919 had invigorated opponents of “military specialists” and had fostered
renewed calls for a more “socialist” Red Army. Large sections of the Soviet Republic
remained outside of effective Bolshevik control, the Ukraine was plagued by anarchic
violence, and Siberia was still occupied by forces hostile to the regime. Heightened
tensions with the nascent Polish Republic threatened a renewed outbreak of widespread
military conflict. Last but not least, growing dissatisfaction amongst crucial sectors of
support for the Bolsheviks undermined a tenuous social compact between the regime and
the governed. Two more years of civil war lay ahead.
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Chapter Three: Trotsky and the End of the Civil War, Late 1919 to 1922
“The workers’ and peasants’ army, which has protected the workers and peasants with
its blood from the onslaught of the landlords and capitalists, must now apply all its free
forces and resources to helping the cause of the country’s economic rebirth.”- Lev
Trotsky, February 192072
Fall 1919 marked the high-water point for those forces opposing the Bolsheviks in
the Russian Civil War. Yudenich’s army had been decisively defeated on the outskirts of
Petrograd; his army had ceased to exist by December 1919. The Bolsheviks’ conquest of
Admiral Kolchak’s forces at Omsk was followed by his execution on 7 February 1920.
Denikin’s defeats in late October 1919 marked the beginning of the end for the Volunteer
Army. Throughout the winter of 1919 and into the spring of 1920, the Red Army drove
the Volunteers south. What had begun as a retreat quickly deteriorated into an irreversible
rout. On 17 December, 1919 the Red Army recaptured Kiev. In early 1920, therefore,
many Bolsheviks assumed the worst of the Civil War violence was over. Trotsky made
note of the victories: “In the struggle against this all-powerful force, our Red Army has
shown itself equal to its task. This has been acknowledged by those opponents who were
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saying eighteen months ago: ‘You won’t create an army’, and who now say: ‘You have
created an army, and a good one.’ And how can they not say that, when this army is
beating, over an expanse of nine or ten thousand versts, the enemy mobilized and armed
by world capital?”73
The victorious powers of World War I had sustained the White movement for two
years. Hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, ammunition, uniforms, and even tanks and
airplanes had been supplied to the various White armies. Fourteen nations had pledged to
oppose the Bolshevik state in what Winston Churchill had called “the anti-Bolshevik
crusade.” France, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, and Japan had all sent troops to
Russian soil. Although direct confrontations between armed Bolsheviks and the Allies
were rare, the Bolshevik propaganda exploited the foreign presence to maximum effect.
The collapse of the White resistance in the fall of 1919 was a decisive blow to Churchill
and others who sought to maintain external military pressure on the Soviet state. Aid to
the Whites was increasingly regarded as a waste of time and money. The need for
Western European governments to rebuild at home after years of war took precedence
over their assertion of power abroad. Public figures advocating trade and engagement
with the Bolsheviks, such as the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, asserted
themselves politically. Mawdsley noted: “By late autumn 1919 the flow of arms had
begun to dry up, and then the winter of military disasters in Siberia and the Kuban
seemed to prove that the Whites had no future. The British now wanted to normalize
relations with Moscow, and they tried to interpose themselves between Reds and
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Whites.”74 The possibility of an imminent conclusion to Allied intervention strengthened
the convictions of leading Bolsheviks that an end to civil war was just around the corner.
Still, Bolshevik power was far from secure. After six years of uninterrupted
warfare, Russia’s economy was in ruins. The civil war had led to a dramatic decline in
population. Suny recorded the immense scale of the calamity: “At least 1 million people
died in combat or from White or Red acts of terror during the Russian civil war. Several
million more died from disease, hunger, and the cold. About a million people left the
country and never returned.”75 Nowhere was the decline in population more in evidence
than in the industrial cities of Central Russia which were home to the proletariat upon
whom the Bolshevik Party relied for political and economic support. The violent
upheaval of civil war had severed the ties between city and countryside. The workers and
their representatives in the Soviet government lacked both finished goods and viable
currency to exchange for food. The Bolsheviks resorted to requisitioning. Hundreds of
thousands still starved. In the wake of mass starvation came epidemic diseases that led
thousands more to perish. Recurring typhus epidemics were especially lethal. Many
workers who were still able fled the cities. The historian Diane Koenker described the
scale of the exodus: “Moscow’s population towards the end of the Civil War was thus
half of what it had been in the midst of the 1917 revolution. An even more catastrophic
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fall occurred in Petrograd: its population plummeted from 2.5 million in 1917 to 700,000
in 1920.”76
Population losses were aggravated by diminished supplies of raw materials. Fuel
for industries grew scarce as coal and timber disappeared from the cities. Crucial
resources such as iron, lead, and copper were similarly scarce. Industry ground to a
virtual halt. By the end of the civil war, the Bolsheviks assembled just 50,000 rifles a
month, a fraction of the pre-Revolutionary output. As a consequence, less than half of all
Red Army soldiers were armed at the beginning of 1920.77 The manufacture of
ammunition, uniforms, and artillery fared no better. The lack of provisions for the army
was a reminder of the overall weakness of the Soviet state.
In June 1918 all factories directly involved in the manufacture of war materials
were placed under the control of Trotsky’s War Commissariat to combat the Red Army’s
deficiencies in supplies. A special regime of military discipline in the workplace was
introduced to guarantee production. After this militarization of the defense industry,
Trotsky worked to apply military methods to other branches of the economy. As he
proclaimed in early 1920: “Inasmuch as the army possesses the greatest amount of
experience of mass Soviet organization of this type, its methods and procedures must
(with all necessary modifications) be transferred to the sphere of labor organization.”78
He began to perceive the militarization of the entire economy as a remedy for three of the
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most serious disorders afflicting the Soviet economy: worker absenteeism, a collapse in
the transportation network, and an unreliable supply of raw materials (including basic
foodstuffs).
The failure of a large portion of the urban labor force to report to work on a
regular basis was a crucial handicap to overall productivity. Increased wages were useless
as incentives. Inflation had robbed the ruble of its value. State wages were too small to
purchase the food necessary for survival, so workers took days off to scavenge for food
or work higher-paying moonlight jobs. By late 1919, payment-in-kind was the only truly
effective means of compensating workers, yet the government had no surplus
commodities with which to make these reimbursements. As punishment and payment
grew less effective, the number of workers reporting for duty declined. The scholar
Silvana Malle has documented the scale of absenteeism: “In the first quarter of 1920,
overall absenteeism in Russia was computed at about 40-50 percent of the total
workforce.”79 The seriousness of the problem was not lost on Trotsky, who declared:
“Whoever falls to come to work on time, or who wastes his time when in the workshop,
or occupies himself there with work ‘on the side’, or simply stays away on a workday, is
an enemy of socialist Russia who is undermining her future.”80 The Bolsheviks’ inability
to induce the proletariat to work was partly due to the hunger and disease which
continued to plague urban areas throughout Russia. Workers were so physically
weakened by illness that they could not drag themselves to work on a daily basis.
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Many plants were also idled by a lack of fuel, or of raw materials, or of both.
Prior to winter 1919-1920, the industrial heartland of Central Russia was cut off from the
majority of the former Russian Empire. Regions such as the Caucasus, Siberia, Central
Asia, and the Donbas that had supplied crucial resources such as coal, timber, cotton, and
iron had ceased to provide inputs for Bolshevik production. The dearth of fuel and metals
was especially harmful to war production. As Lincoln observed: “Russia’s mills and
factories faced the winter of 1919-1920 with only a tenth of the fuel they needed… With
too few raw materials and too little fuel, iron production in 1920 fell to about a fortieth of
the prewar figure. Steel stood at a sixtieth and copper production stopped altogether.”81
At the beginning of 1920, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, and Ukraine were
all well on their way to being absorbed into the Bolshevik polity. The new territories held
desperately needed natural resources, but the Bolsheviks lacked the means to access
them. This was in large part due to the disintegration of Russia’s transportation grid,
especially the railroads. In October 1917 the Bolsheviks inherited over 350,000 working
freight cars and 15,000 functioning locomotives, along with a network of tracks that
stretched over 30,000 miles. During the war the party proved of incapable of maintaining
rail transport. Hundreds of thousands of freight cars and thousands of locomotives broke
down. The historian William Rosenberg described the decline: “By the end of 1918 the
amount of freight carried on these lines had fallen almost 70 percent. In August 1918,
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only some 9,000 freight cars were loaded or unloaded. Eighteen months later, in January
1920, the figure had barely risen to 12,000.”82
Over the winter of 1919-1920, Trotsky reflected on the relationship between the
worsening economic situation and the heightened prospects for domestic peace. At this
point the Red Army was well on its way to reaching its peak enlistment of over five-anda-half million soldiers, which was achieved by late 1920. An end to combat operations
would mean a large number of these men would have to be demobilized, and could
therefore be directed to the urgent task of rebuilding the economy. It also meant that the
Bolsheviks would finally have an opportunity to transition to the militia system they had
so long endorsed. For Trotsky the transition to a militia system and a gradual
militarization of the economy were inseparable. He began to elaborate a plan for their
realization.
Earlier proponents of a socialist militia had envisioned factories as the basis for a
self-sufficient military unit. Men would train under arms alongside their fellow
proletarians at their place of work. In the event of war, they would enter combat in units
that were formed from their local production brigades. Trotsky took this thesis and turned
it on its head. If the workers of a factory, mine, or lumber camp could provide the basis
for a military unit, then, he argued, a military unit could just as easily provide the
workforce for a factory, mine, or lumber camp. Economic decline stemmed from
insufficient organization on the part of the state and from the unwillingness of large
sectors of the population to cooperate in the building of socialism. His proposed solution
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was a state-directed mobilization of labor to fulfill the socialist economic plan. Trotsky
described his vision in late 1919: “Socialist economy presupposes a general plan that
embraces the [country’s] entire territory, with all its natural resources, means of
production and live human powers… The continuity and completeness of the production
process must be sustained and ensured by universal labor service, under which every
able-bodied citizen, within certain age limits, is obliged to devote a certain part of his
time to one branch or another of the production process.”83
Trotsky outlined his plan to transform of the economic and military spheres in a
set of twenty-three theses on December 1919. He asserted that a central plan must be at
the heart of a socialist economy, and that such a plan could only be implemented by
militarizing the entire labor force. As part of this process, the “anarchy” of the market
would be replaced by discipline and reason. Army discipline would be applied to
economic life. In each locality, the mobilization of the labor force would be tied to the
creation of a local militia. The War Commissariat would be responsible for directing the
mobilization. While the mobilization was to occur gradually, Trotsky argued the process
should begin as soon as possible. An initial plan could focus on militarizing workers in
coal and iron mines, and in the country’s most important state factories.
Trotsky’s campaign for the militarization of labor received a major boost with the
creation of the First Revolutionary Labor Army on 15 January 1920. The First Labor
Army was created from the already existing Third Red Army after it had ceased combat
operations in the Urals. The original proposal for the labor army came unsolicited from
the leadership of the Third Army’s Revolutionary Military Council at the beginning of
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January. Benvenuti described the situation: “An example was set by the eastern front 3rd
army, whose leaders resolved to proceed, at the beginning of January, with a radical
conversion of their unit’s tasks.”84 Bolshevik Party members on the unit’s Council were
well aware of the party’s heightened interest in putting the armed forces to work to repair
the nation’s economy. The leaders of the Third Army argued their location in the Urals
presented them with a unique opportunity. The region was close to the relatively
abundant West Siberian food stores that could sustain a prolonged military presence.
Local factories had a need for disciplined workers, and skilled and semi-skilled workers
currently serving in the Third Army could provide such a labor force. Even unskilled
Third Army soldiers could be highly useful if they were dispatched to harvest local
supplies of timber, ore, and coal.
Trotsky received the proposal and forwarded it to Lenin. Both men
enthusiastically championed the idea at a Council of People’s Commissars on 13 January
1920. The initiative received the Council’s unanimous support; two days later the First
Revolutionary Labor Army was born. Its creation was made official by an order from
Trotsky that spelled out the Labor Army’s duties. The army was to remain at arms and be
prepared to deploy for combat, if needed. The Labor Army’s primary functions were to
requisition grain and gather scarce coal and lumber. Skilled laborers would be deployed
to select factories to work alongside the local proletariat. The Labor Army would be
controlled by the unit’s Revolutionary Military Council, which would also be expanded
to include representatives of “the main economic institutions of the Soviet Republic.”
The unit would in no way be answerable to local party organs--- a provision bound to
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rankle regional authorities. The Labor Army would keep detailed records of resource
inputs and production outputs, so that a clear picture of the unit’s progress could be
measured by central party authorities. Those soldiers temporarily acting as workers
would still be subject to the Red Army’s disciplinary policy. Failure to report to work
would be considered an act of desertion and would be punished accordingly.
Trotsky and Lenin were so enthusiastic about the prospects for expanding on the
Third Army’s experiment that, two days later, they drafted plans to create similar forces
in the Kuban, Ukraine, Kazan, and Petrograd. Their proposals were approved by the
Politburo on 18 January 1920. Over the next two years, nine labor armies were formed
from existing units of the Red Army. These units greatly expanded the influence of
Trotsky and other military leaders over the Soviet economy. Supporters of the project
credited the labor armies with extending “socialist” forms of production to marginal
regions of the country. Labor armies were even credited with exceeding their civilian
peers in productivity, although any accurate comparison between the two must take into
account the superior food rations and living conditions of the soldiers. Trotsky praised the
armies’ superior output: “What is most comforting is the fact that the productivity of
labor is regularly increasing, in step with the improvement in the way it is organized…
wherever the experiment of using army units for labor tasks was carried out with any
intelligence at all, the results showed that this method is unquestionably viable and
correct.”85
Despite initial support from an overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik Party’s
leaders, including Trotsky’s personal nemeses Zinoviev and Stalin, the labor armies also
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provoked strong opposition from a surprising cross-section of party members. Local party
bosses were enraged to find that the soldiers were usurping control of economic
enterprises formerly under their jurisdiction. Communists on the left decried what they
saw as a power grab by the military at the expense of what little remained of the
Revolution’s democratic and egalitarian roots. No resistance was more portentous than
that offered by representatives of the Central Council of Trade Unions. Union
functionaries had initially supported the creation of the labor armies on the condition that
the relations between the unions and the soldiers would be cooperative and collaborative
in nature. The reality was much different. Red Army laborers acted without consulting
the local trade unions. The growing disapproval of union members foreshadowed their
future resistance to the militarization of labor.
Trotsky’s commitment to transforming the economy received a further boost on 9
February 1920. En route to the Urals, where he was to conduct a personal inspection of
the First Labor Army, his command train derailed. Despite his status as one of the most
powerful men in the Soviet Republic, no one enquired as to his whereabouts for nearly
twenty-four hours. Meanwhile his train lay buried under several feet of snow less than
two miles from the nearest station. Local railway operators failed to notice the train was
missing: local railway workers charged with signaling passing trains has deserted their
posts. Trotsky was shocked by his personal experience of the collapsing rail system. He
vented his fury publicly in several publications criticizing the lack of worker discipline.
He pledged to overcome the problem by brute force: “Everything depends on transport. If
transport perishes, the country perishes. But workers’ and peasants’ Russia does not want
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to perish, and it will not perish. It will condemn all those to perish who are hindering its
escape from the clutches of want and hunger.”86
The 9th Party Congress, which met from 29 March to 5 April 1920, presented
Trotsky with an opportunity to advance his remedies for the Soviet economy. Trotsky
presented a report on the economic situation, “On the Immediate Tasks of Economic
Construction”, as well as the key-note address on the party’s military policy. Trotsky’s
emergence as a leading voice for both economic and military policy did not diminish the
number of detractors, many of whom felt threatened by what they saw as his
disproportionate share of political power. His report on the economy was copied verbatim
from an earlier set of thirty-one theses which he had presented to the Central Committee
on 4 February 1920. In the wake of this presentation, the Central Committee appointed
him to deliver the report on the economy at the upcoming Congress.
In many respects, the thirty-one theses of 1920 resembled the twenty-three theses
on militarizing labor from 16 December 1919. The new document called on the party to
apply the experience gained from the construction of the Red Army to questions of labor.
This could be done by directly transferring military methods into the workplace. The
report stated: “Inasmuch as the army possesses the greatest amount of experience of mass
Soviet organization of this type, its methods and procedures must (with all necessary
modifications) be transferred to the sphere of labor organization, with direct utilization of
the experience of those workers who have been moved from military to economic
work.”87 All factory work was to be based on a national plan for the economy approved
by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Military discipline would be applied to
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the workforce, so that absenteeism and low productivity could be met with the strictest
punishments. Labor service was to become a duty for all Soviet citizens capable of
working. A military-style campaign to “conscript” the peasantry for labor outside of
agriculture would be conducted: peasants and unemployed workers would be compelled
to fell timber, to mine coal and iron, to transport goods, and generally to aid in the
performance of tasks considered useful by the party. Skilled laborers would be
conscripted for service in the nation’s factories in a campaign directed under the joint
auspices of the War Commissariat and the Central Council of Trade Unions. Unions
would see their role in crafting economic policy and advocating for the rights of workers
replaced, as unions themselves were to be transformed into organs of state power. Strikes
were to be made illegal and treated as revolts against the state. Lastly, the theses formally
endorsed the creation of the labor armies and called for continuing the transformation of
Red Army units into militarized production brigades. Following the lead of the Central
Committee, the Congress endorsed Trotsky’s report.
Three groups in the party emerged to oppose Trotsky’s proposals: the Bolshevik
right, the “democratic centralists”, and the trade union bureaucracy. Members on the right
of the party’s political spectrum thought Trotsky’s emphasis on compulsory labor would
reduce economic productivity. The leading spokesman for this group was the Chairman
of the Supreme Council of National Economy, Alexei Rykov. Trotsky attacked Rykov’s
claims by arguing that compulsion is necessary for the construction of a socialist
economy. Trotsky contended that people are naturally lazy and will work only if
compelled to by some outside force. Since the labor market no longer existed, the
Bolshevik state would have to provide an alternative: namely, a “rational, scientific” plan
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for the economy. He even asserted that workers would embrace compulsion, because they
shared the goal of building socialism. Vladimir Brovkin described Trotsky’s logic as
follows: “Since the state was a workers’ and socialist state, its compulsion of the workers
should not be feared, because in the end it had the workers’ best interests in mind.”88
A larger group of opponents, known as the “democratic centralists,” drew support
from the trade unions to attack the resolution on broader grounds. The leading spokesmen
for this group were Timofei Sapronov and Nikolai Osinsky. The democratic centralists
labeled Trotsky a modern day “Arakcheev.” They considered his demands for the
militarization of labor to be a twentieth-century redux of the brutal nineteenth-century
military settlements sponsored by Arakcheev. By restricting the movement of workers
and subjecting them to military discipline, the Soviet regime would be enserfing its own
citizens. Osinsky argued that the consequences of this militarization would also have a
deleterious effect on the party. Internal party democracy could not survive in a state
where all aspects of life were governed by military methods. Sapronov went a step
further and argued that militarization would replace the dictatorship of the proletariat
with a dictatorship of the bureaucrats. Brovkin reformulated this argument: “If socialism,
he argued, actually meant the dictatorship of appointed bureaucrats who fulfill orders,
why then all this talk about the dictatorship of the proletariat, which supposedly exists;
why then all this talk about workers’ self-organization and independent activity?”89
The democratic centralists received support from members of the trade unions.
Union members supported many points of Trotsky’s report, including a national plan for
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the economy and the mobilization of the peasantry, but they objected to the proposed
transformation of the trade unions’ responsibilities and to proposed limitations on the
rights of workers. Prior to the 9th Congress, union officials had enjoyed key posts in
economic institutions and had played an important role in drafting economic policy.
Union officials had also been responsible for mediating conflicts in the workplace, and
had considered themselves effective advocates for the interests of the proletariat. Under
Trotsky’s plan, their main function would be to enforce the mobilization of the proletariat
on military lines. Since strikes were to be made illegal and the unions would no longer be
able to mediate on behalf of workers, the proletariat’s well-being would decline.
Trotsky attacked these critics with special force: he labeled them “Menshevik-SR
traitors.” He equated their attack on compulsory labor with an attack on socialism itself.
If the state was not allowed to direct the economy by compelling workers to provide their
labor power, the only alternative was some form of market organization. Trotsky stated:
“After recognizing that we are on the road to socialism, the Mensheviks hurl themselves
with all the greater ferocity upon those methods without which, in the harsh and difficult
conditions of the present time, the transition to socialism cannot be accomplished.”90
Without directly addressing the merits of their argument, Trotsky attempted to tar his
opponents as counter-revolutionaries. His equating of the democratic centralists’ position
with a betrayal of the party was portentous of the manner in which inner-party dissent
would soon be handled.
Trotsky was also responsible for delivering the party’s report on current military
policy. He confidently predicted the imminent defeat of internal opposition, and with it
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an end to the civil war. He argued that an end to the war must be met with a change in the
party’s approach to military affairs. In a complete reversal of his position at the 8th
Congress, he now called on the party to approve the transition to a militia-based army. He
claimed that his new stance was really just the logical extension of his earlier posture,
which had called for adopting a militia once the threat of military defeat had passed. The
remnants of Denikin’s army in the Crimea were all that remained of last year’s powerful
White armies. Peace was at hand, and now the transformation of Soviet military forces
could finally begin. He linked the future militia to the militarization of labor. As workers
were mobilized in a military fashion to rebuild the economy, they would simultaneously
receive training to bear arms. After finishing their military training, they would formally
constitute a militia unit based in their place of work. Benvenuti described the change:
“Now that the mobilization of labor was to provide the workforce with military discipline
and training, it was plain to see that the conscript workers’ units constituted a territorially
based levy.”91 Trotsky’s plan would also retain the best units of the Red Army in a much
smaller standard army operating alongside the territorial militias. In reality, Trotsky’s
proposal was a hybrid of the current system and of an exclusively militia-based army.
The Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution advanced by Trotsky calling for the
creation of a mixed force. This transition to a new type of army was contingent upon an
end to large-scale military operations, and would not begin in earnest till the last of the
White armies had been completely annihilated.
Not everyone in the party was content with the partial transition envisioned in
Trotsky’s resolution. Nikolai Podvoisky, the head of the Universal Military Training
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Administration (Vsevobuch), sought to transform his insignificant auxiliary training
department into the pillar of a militia-based force. The resolution passed at the Congress
had called for a transition to a mixed army after the end of hostilities, but Podvoisky
pressed for an immediate and total transformation of the Red Army. He drew attention to
the fact that all prior party resolutions had described the standing army as a temporary
measure to be maintained for the duration of the civil war. The lack of effective
resistance by the Bolsheviks’ enemies meant the civil war was no longer a sufficient
reason to delay reform. Podvoisky made his case for a total shift to a militia-based system
on both pragmatic and ideological grounds. The costs of maintaining a standing army that
was now close to five-million strong put a great deal of stress on an economy that was
already close to the breaking point. If the party wanted to dedicate itself to rebuilding the
productive forces of society, it would have to divert resources away from the military.
Von Hagen restated Podvoisky’s case: “On purely practical grounds, he argued that the
economic devastation of the country made the demobilization, or at least partial
demobilization, of the army imperative: the nation simply could not afford to support a
vast military machine.”92 Podvoisky argued that a transition to an army composed
entirely of militia units would allow soldiers to act simultaneously as productive workers.
To bolster his claims, he pointed to the arguments of none other than Trotsky concerning
the militia’s role in the militarization of labor. Podvoisky described the militia as a force
capable of fighting for the Soviet state, and capable as well of rebuilding the economy.
The cost of maintaining the militia would be a fraction of the cost of fielding a massive
regular army. Opponents of the militia system parried Podvoisky’s case by pointing to the
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ongoing nature of hostilities. These opponents successfully argued that, until the last of
the Whites had been defeated, it would be foolish to implement any changes as extreme
as those advocated by Podvoisky. At least some units organized in a “regular” fashion
were the best guarantee of a swift military victory. In the end, even Podvoisky went along
with the Congress’ official resolution on hostilities. Radical reform would have to wait.
Podvoisky temporarily conceded his point, but remained as committed as ever to the idea
of a universal militia. He renewed his push at the first available opportunity.
The 9th Congress allowed Trotsky to emerge as a leading light on transportation
issues. Transport was crucial to the economy and the Red Army; its near total collapse
had severely impaired both. The party had long ago confirmed Trotsky as the leading
authority on military policy, but now it had begun to adopt Trotsky’s prescriptions for the
economy by entrusting him with the task of restoring the transport system. In early March
1920 the Central Committee appointed Trotsky Commissar for Transport. He quickly
drew up a program that would overhaul the nation’s rail system. Prior to Trotsky’s
appointment, the transport system had been administered by twenty-eight regional
bureaucracies. His plan called for replacing this system with a central administration run
from Moscow. The entire rail network was to be subjected to military discipline. Strikes
were to be immediately declared illegal, and absenteeism would be punished as desertion.
One-man rule (edinolichnost’), in which a single local official would be held personally
responsible for the performance of his production unit, was to be implemented. This
official would also have sole command of those under him, putting an end to collegial
forms of administration. Last but not least, the railroad union (Tsekprofsoiuz) was to be
radically reorganized. The union would give up its function as an advocate for railway-
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men. Now its sole charge would be to act as an organ of the state in charge of railroad
administration, with local union officials acting the part of managers.
At the 9th Congress, Trotsky’s outline for a new transport policy was
enthusiastically endorsed, and his new position in the Commissariat of Transport was
confirmed. The move to establish the transport union as an administrative organ of the
state was in keeping with a larger redefinition of the role of the unions endorsed at the
Congress. The trade unions were to represent the party and build support for its policies.
Trotsky anticipated that his vision for the transport system would be resisted by the the
railway workers. He called on the Congress to endorse his proposal to use the party
organization in the Commissariat of Transport, the Glavpolitput, as an instrument to
insure his directives were carried out. Officials of Glavpolitput would be tasked with
traveling the country and personally implementing the railway reform. Workers and
bureaucrats who attempted to obstruct the reorganization of transport would be arrested.
The party endorsed this proposal, as well as the rest of Trotsky’s reforms. The
transportation sector was now firmly under his control. His dedication to fixing
transportation was apparent, but his methods promised conflict with those already
working in transport. Rosenberg outlined the problem: “Trotsky approached his new post
not only with the energy and disposition he showed in building the Red Army and the
determination to apply military methods to transport, but also with an evident prejudice
against railroad workers generally, whom he regarded as untrustworthy and backward.”93
The 9th Party Congress marked the peak of Trotsky’s political power. He
commanded both the transport sector and the military. He was also a leading authority in
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formulating the state’s economic program. Trotsky was second only to Lenin in the
power that he exercised over the direction of the Soviet state. His plans for the economy,
military, and the railways had all been approved by the party and were now government
policy. Despite his numerous victories, however, Trotsky had elicited the jealousies of
less powerful party members who might otherwise have agreed with his proposals. What
is more, a growing number of left-wing Bolsheviks saw Trotsky’s ideals as a betrayal of
the principles of the October Revolution. The Bolsheviks had seized power while
advocating worker control of the state and attacking the militarization of Russian society.
Trotsky’s opponents on the left argued that he was now enforcing government control of
the workers in a state that more closely resembled a regular army than a proletarian
democracy. The Bolsheviks had justified many of their authoritarian policies as
temporary measures introduced to win the war. With the conflict winding down, more
and more party members began to call for an end to these unpopular policies.
Hopes for an imminent return to peace proved short-lived. Growing tensions on
the Soviet state’s western borders would soon boil over into full-scale warfare. The end
of the First World War had brought with it the birth of over half a dozen new states in
Central and Eastern Europe, including the Republic of Poland. The new Polish state was
created from territory that had previously belonged to the German, Russian, and AustroHungarian Empires. It drew on the memory of a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that
had once stretched from the Baltic to the Black Seas. The Commonwealth had suffered a
number of military defeats in the early modern era that culminated at the end of the
eighteenth century with its partition among the three aforementioned empires. The Polish
Republic’s new leader and commander-in-chief, Jozef Pilsudski had been born in the
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Commonwealth’s old capital of Wilno, a city that in 1918 was located on the disputed
borders of Lithuania, Poland and Soviet Russia. Pilsudski dreamed of reviving the old
Commonwealth in the form of a Polish-dominated federation of states that would
encompass most of the former Russian Empire’s eastern borderlands. His territorial
ambitions almost immediately brought the Polish Republic into conflict with the nascent
Soviet state. As the historian Norman Davies noted: “Pilsudski argued that Poland, as the
strongest state, had a duty to guarantee the conditions of self-determination for all the
nations in the area. Needless to say, they took no account of the plans and aspirations
existing in Moscow.”94
The first battles between Poles and Bolsheviks occurred in early 1919. Minor
skirmishes were followed by a Polish offensive beginning in March that culminated in
Pilsudski’s personal supervision of a successful assault on Wilno in April. The Polish
advance continued at a much slower pace throughout the summer, virtually halting after
the capture of Minsk on 8 August 1919. Throughout 1919 the Red Army had been too
busy fighting internal enemies to devote much attention to the Polish threat. Despite their
temporary advantage, the Poles were prevented from capitalizing on the situation by their
own weaknesses. The Polish Republic was less than a year old; it was attempting to
engage in combat operations while the administrative structure of the state was still under
construction. Organizational problems were compounded by a lack of military supplies
and political infighting. Davies described the reigning disorder: “Units with French rifles
were issued with German ammunition; Austrian officers resented serving under Tsarist
colleagues whom they had ‘defeated’; Poznanian units disliked serving in the east when
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Poznan was still threatened by the Germans in the west.”95 When the Bolshevik state
seemed to be on the verge of collapse in October 1919, Pilsudski refused to assist in
delivering a death blow to the Reds by coordinating attacks with the White forces. After
the Whites had been defeated, Poland was then left to face the Bolsheviks largely on its
own. At the beginning of 1920, Pilsudski began to hatch a plan for a decisive Polish
victory on its eastern borders.
In early 1919 the Red Army had attempted to parry the Polish attacks with little
success. In summer and fall 1919 the growing threat of defeat in the civil war had led the
Bolsheviks cautiously to explore the prospects for peace with Poland. Leading
Bolsheviks, including Trotsky, believed that peace in the west would help the Red
Army’s prospects for victory over its internal enemies. In July 1919, Julian Marchlewski,
a Polish communist, was dispatched to negotiate with the Poles towards this end.
Negotiations proved futile, so Marchlewski returned to Moscow empty-handed on 30
July 1919. The Bolshevik Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Grigory Chicherin, addressed
repeated peace offers to the Poles throughout the fall of 1919, without success. When
Pilsudski refused to join Denikin’s push towards Moscow in October, the prospects for
peace seemed brighter. On 3 November 1919 Pilsudski offered the Bolsheviks ceasefire
terms that would preserve Polish gains in the west. Trotsky lobbied the Central
Committee to accept the terms, but the negotiations halted when Lenin criticized the
Poles for their continued support of the Ukrainian nationalist Simon Petliura. By January
1920, it was clear peace could not be negotiated, so Trotsky reversed his position as
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advocate for peace with Poland. On 10 March 1920 he signed off on a plan that would
deploy nearly 200,000 Red Army soldiers on the western border by the end of April.
The deployment never had a chance to come to fruition. Pilsudski realized that
Poland’s chances for victory would be slim, if the Bolsheviks were given the opportunity
to deploy the full strength of the Red Army against them. To prevent it, Pilsudski
gambled on a pre-emptive attack. Polish troops invaded Ukraine, followed by Ukrainian
forces of Simon Petliura. It was hoped that the Ukrainian population would rally to the
support of Petliura’s puppet government and would help the Poles to drive out the
Bolsheviks. After the Red Army had been driven from Ukraine, the Poles would
capitalize on their strategic advantage to sue for peace. Poland would then be largely
protected from the Soviets by a new buffer state, and Pilsudski’s dream of an Eastern
European federation would be one step closer to reality. The Polish Army began to
mobilize for the planned offensive in early spring 1920. The offensive was to begin in
earnest no later than the first week of May.
On 5 March 1920 the Polish Army launched a successful but limited offensive
around Mozyr that effectively separated the Red Army units operating on the north and
south of the western front. The northern group would not be able to come to the defense
of Soviet forces in Ukraine without breaking through the Polish forces deployed in their
way. The Poles spent the rest of March and most of April reinforcing their positions
around the border with Ukraine. On 24 April the Polish forces struck. Four Polish army
groups with over 52,000 men stormed from the west and northwest across the lightly
defended border. Soviet forces on the Polish border of the Southwestern Front numbered
somewhere between 12,000 to 28,000 soldiers capable of bearing arms (the numbers are
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disputed). Regardless, the Poles held at least a 2-to-1 advantage over their foes, so the
Polish forces advanced rapidly. Within two weeks they had occupied Kiev with only
minimal losses. Still, ominously, the Twelfth and Fourteenth Red Armies had retreated
largely intact, and the Poles had yet to score a decisive victory in any major battle. Davies
highlighted the initial results of the Polish invasion: “From the Polish point of view the
results were only moderately encouraging. They had gained an enormous tract of
territory; but had failed to trap the enemy.”96
This failure to trap the Bolshevik units did not bode well for the Polish Army.
Even worse, the local population had greeted the invading Poles and their Ukrainian
puppet government with indifference or outright hostility. A combination of the
widespread fear that a Polish victory would put an end to land reform and of anti-Polish
Ukrainian nationalism led even militant anti-Bolsheviks to look on the Polish occupation
with disfavor. When the Bolsheviks began successfully to push back against the Poles,
the local population did nothing to stop the Red Army. Even before the Polish invasion,
the Red Army had been steadily redeploying its forces to the borderlands. On 23 April
Budyonnyi’s First Cavalry Army embarked from Rostov for Ukraine. In spite of previous
reversals, the Red Army had mustered three army groups and two special task forces on
the Southwestern Front by the second week of May. On 12 May 1920 the Polish invasion
sputtered to a halt on the eastern outskirts of Kiev. From here on out, the Red Army
would take the offensive.
On 27 May units of the First Red Cavalry began to reconnoiter Polish positions
southeast of Kiev. On 31 May they launched a major assault on Polish positions all down
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the line. After six days of heavy fighting, the First Cavalry scored a decisive
breakthrough into the rear of the Polish forces; the Polish Third Army was now encircled.
The rest of the Red Army units on the Southwestern Front now went over to the
offensive. Davies described the decisive results of the Bolsheviks’ victory: “The
breakthrough of 5 June started a general advance of the Soviet forces in the south which
continued unchecked for the next ten weeks.”97 On 10 June 1920 Kiev was retaken.
Barely a month after the start of the Polish invasion, the Red Army had driven the Poles
back onto Polish territory. The campaign ended in disaster for the Poles both politically
and militarily. The Polish invasion had galvanized large sections of the local population
to support the Bolshevik regime in a manner previously unseen during the civil war.
Labor activists throughout Europe had mobilized workers to halt shipments of weapons
and supplies to “the Polish aggressor.” The government of the United Kingdom had
condemned the invasion and had refused the Poles critical aid. In the military sphere,
Poland was now threatened with invasion from two directions in both the north and the
south.
In early July 1920, Russian society and the party were united in their desire to
punish the Polish aggressor. Leading Bolsheviks publicly called for “liberating” Warsaw
from the “lordly Polish aggressors.” In a move that caught many of his fellow party
members off guard, Trotsky found himself advocating peace. In summer 1920, the
Bolsheviks were immersed in negotiations to reopen trade with the West that could
potentially provide the Soviet state with critical supplies of machine parts, manufactured
goods, and other scarce commodities. The invasion of Polish territory easily put an end to
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all that. Trotsky worried about the prospects for any Bolshevik “liberation” of Poland.
Several leading Bolsheviks, including Feliks Dzerzhinsky, were of Polish extraction.
These same men now warned the Politburo that any invasion would be met with a surge
in nationalist sentiment similar to what had occurred in Soviet Russia following the
Polish occupation of the Ukraine. Trotsky took this warning seriously. He argued that the
combined threat of Britain’s diplomatic reprisals and Polish resistance did not merit
further prosecution of the war. He responded enthusiastically when the British offered
their services as mediators. Deutscher described Trotsky’s actions: “On the same day,
July 13, Trotsky replied in two messages, urging the Politburo and Chicherin to accept
British mediation between Russia and Poland, and to aim at an armistice which would
lead to peace with the Entente as well as with Poland.”98
Trotsky’s proposal was rebuffed. The Politburo was well aware of the Bolsheviks’
military advantage over the Poles and was anxious to press forward. Lenin held out hope
that a victory in Poland might be the crucial spark to touch off revolution in the west. For
Lenin, Poland was a bridge for exporting upheaval to Germany and to the more advanced
nations of Europe. Trotsky resigned himself to working towards a military victory despite
his misgivings about party military strategy. He called for a total commitment that would
mobilize all the resources of the Soviet state. Trotsky declared: “The fight will be a fight
to the death, it will be an extremely intense and severe one… It follows from all this that
we must see the war with Poland not as a partial task for the Western front, but as the
central task for all workers’ and peasants’ Russia.”99 To ensure victory Trotsky presided
over the assembly of the largest concentration of Soviet forces put together in the civil
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war period. Under the leadership of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, a strike force of 190,000
soldiers was assembled on the Western Front to the north of Ukraine. By early July five
separate army groups had been placed under Tukhachevsky’s command. Soviet forces
enjoyed a numerical superiority over their Polish opponents by some 50,000 men.
Events on the Southwestern Front prevented the Bolsheviks from fully
committing to an attack from two fronts. On 6 June 1920 the remnants of Denikin’s
Volunteer Army had launched a surprise attack aimed at Red Army forces on the
Crimean peninsula. These survivors were rallied by their new commander, Baron Pyotr
Wrangel. Wrangel was a towering figure with sound strategic sense who inspired his
followers’ respect and devotion. After barely a month in charge, Wrangel had brought the
Volunteers back from the brink of collapse and restored their fighting spirit. Their
surprise attack at the beginning of June caught the Bolsheviks by off guard. In a matter of
days they broke through the Red Army’s strong fortifications, and for nearly a month
after the Whites proved unbeatable in battle. By the beginning of July, they had
reconquered the whole of the Crimea and reached the banks of the Don. Wrangel began
to lay plans for a seaborne invasion of the Kuban. As the Bolsheviks prepared to invade
Poland, they were forced to divert crucial reserves away from the Southwestern Front to
contain Wrangel in the Crimea. The brunt of the Soviet attack on Poland would have to
be borne by Tukhachevsky’s armies alone. Lincoln detailed the situation: “Wrangel’s
forces now posed a serious danger to Russia’s grain, coal, and oil supplies. By the
beginning of July, the Bolsheviks knew that they had to take the reborn White Army
seriously.”100
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Despite the setbacks in the Southwest, the Bolshevik High Command decided to
press on with the attack. On 4 July 1920 Tukhachevsky’s men crossed the Berezina river,
beginning the invasion of Poland. For three days a fierce battle raged, but on 7 July
Polish resistance crumbled. Ghaia Dmitrievich Ghai and his Third Cavalry Army
(Kavkor) wreaked havoc on the enemy’s rear. The Poles were forced to retreat across the
entire Western front in what threatened to turn into a rout. The advance of the Red Army
proved unstoppable. Over the next three weeks the Polish Army suffered defeat after
defeat. By early August, Tukhachevksy was within striking distance of Warsaw. On the
Southwestern Front the Bolsheviks had also gone over to the offensive and had been
initially successful in driving the Poles back to the gates of Lvov. If all had gone
according to plan, the Southwestern Front would have continued its advance and linked
up with its comrades to the North in a two-pronged assault on Warsaw. Unfortunately for
Trotsky and the Red Army, the Poles in the Southwest managed to halt the Bolsheviks at
Lvov.
By this point, Tukhachevsky had lost his advantage in manpower; the Polish
forces at Warsaw outnumbered the Red Army by 40,000 men--- 156,000 soldiers
compared to Tukhachevsky’s 116,000. Tukhachevsky’s men, exhausted from three weeks
of virtually uninterrupted success, suffered from overextended supply lines. What is
more, the Poles were dug in and enjoyed a tremendous lift in morale. The entire country
stood behind the Polish Army, in what every Pole believed was a fight for their very
survival as a nation. Tukhachevsky was in desperate need of assistance from the forces
on the Southwestern Front if he was to succeed in conquering Warsaw. On August 13
1920 Trotsky and Sergey Kamenev issued orders to the Twelfth Army and to the First
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Cavalry Army of the Southwestern Front to make all haste towards Warsaw, just two
days before Tukhachevsky was to mount his attack.
The assault on Warsaw commenced on 15 August. After a few isolated victories,
Tukhachevsky’s forces were stopped. Two days later, Pilsudski initiated a counterattack
on Tukhachevky’s exposed left flank. By 18 August it was clear that the Bolsheviks’
prospects for victory were nonexistent: the five army groups participating in the attack
would be lucky to escape fully intact. Tukhachevsky hoped in vain for some assistance
from the Southwest. The First Cavalry did not even attempt to move on Warsaw till 20
August, two days into the disastrous rout of Tukhachevsky’s forces. Tukhachevsky and
Trotsky both were quick to suspect foul play. Stalin was the chief political officer of the
Southwestern Front, and many of the force’s leaders (including Budyonnyi himself) were
members of what was derisively referred to as the “Tsaritsyn clique.” These men were
politically loyal to Stalin. Early in the campaign, Stalin had objected to the primacy of
Tukhachevsky’s force. It certainly did not help matters that Tukhachevsky was perceived
as a close associate of Trotsky. When the Southwestern Front was slow in coming to
Tukhachevsky’s assistance, Trotsky accused Stalin of insubordination. Budyonnyi argued
that the orders had not been clearly articulated and that his forces had been too deeply
engaged at Lvov to respond quickly. Davies stated: “According to Trotsky, Stalin could
neither bear to watch Tukhachevsky’s triumph at Warsaw, nor to be overshadowed by
Tukhachevsky’s political officer.”101
The question of who was to blame for the Warsaw debacle remained in dispute,
but the results of the battle were very clear. Tukhachevksy’s defeat at Warsaw was an
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irreversible setback for the Red Army. Two of five army groups were completely
annihilated. The men of the Western Front were forced to retreat as quickly as they had
advanced. Throughout the end of August and during the entirety of September,
Tukhachevky’s men fled without fielding a successful defense. Trotsky lobbied hard for
the Politburo to make peace with the Poles. Now was the time to concentrate on
destroying Wrangel, so that an end to the civil war could be reached before winter. The
gravest threat to Soviet security was the collapse of the economy, and only peace would
allow the Bolsheviks to rebuild. Trotsky publicly declared his position at the end of
September: “We are defending ourselves and fighting for peace. Where the slightest
possibility exists for us to do this, we strive to safeguard peace for the working people at
the price not of blood but of concessions.”102 At the beginning of October, even Lenin
realized the costs of the Polish war were no longer worth it, so the Politburo sued for
peace. On 12 October 1920 an armistice with Poland was signed; the agreement largely
preserved the Soviet-Polish borders as they had stood in spring 1920. The Red Army’s
first foray into foreign war had ended in stalemate.
Now the full weight of the Red Army would be brought to bear on the meager
forces of Wrangel’s Volunteers. Wrangel knew the situation was hopeless. A failed
invasion of the Kuban in early October had cost his men dearly; the White commander
realized the best he could hope for now was an orderly evacuation of the Crimea. At the
end of October 1920, Mikhail Frunze was entrusted with the command of five Red Army
groups in what was to be the final major campaign of the civil war. Wrangel deployed his
men on the strongly fortified positions of the Perekop, while he organized a fleet of ships
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to evacuate all who could escape. 7 November 1920, the third anniversary of the October
Revolution, marked the beginning of the Bolshevik offensive. The forces of the Red
Army outnumbered the last White forces by 190,000 troops to just 26,000 Volunteers.
Wrangel’s men fought a courageous holding action, but all that his men could hope for
was to delay the Bolshevik advance. In this sense, Wrangel’s gambit was successful. A
handful of courageous men fought valiantly for nine days, while most of their comrades
escaped by sea. Lincoln noted the final outcome: “On the afternoon of 16 November,
1920 the last of the Whites--- 145, 693 men, women, and children--- were aboard 126
ships en route to Constantinople.”103
After three years of continuous warfare, Trotsky and the Red Army celebrated
what nearly all believed would to be the end of civil war. Still, the economy was in ruins,
hundreds of thousands of citizens were starving, and large sections of Russian society
remained openly hostile to Bolshevik power. The coming months would provide a crucial
test of the Bolshevik’s ability to maintain their rule. The anxious populace waited to see
if peace would bring the socialist utopia the Bolsheviks had so earnestly promised.
Trotsky and those around him in the Soviet elite understood the importance of delivering
on past promises, but the means to build socialism were fiercely disputed. Trotsky argued
that the experience of constructing the Red Army illuminated the path forward.
Egalitarian slogans and utopian promises from before the Revolution would have to be
abandoned, and the party would have to face difficult realities. To build socialism in a
backwards country would require tremendous sacrifice from the people and a number of
ideological compromises by the party.
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For many Bolsheviks on the left these sacrifices proved too much to ask. War had
justified unsavory measures, but peace meant the time for accommodation was over.
These men and women passionately objected to nearly all of Trotsky’s positions: a strong
party, a mixed military force, the militarization of labor, and the subordination of the
trade unions to the party. Instead they advocated democratic processes (for socialists and
those of the proper class background) and worker control, ideals they believed had been
central to Bolshevik ideology before the Revolution. Even more ominously, a growing
number of Bolsheviks and communist sympathizers in the armed forces were beginning
to express their dissatisfaction with government policy. Soldiers being demobilized from
the Red Army took up arms in the countryside to fend off grain-requisitioning squads.
Sailors and soldiers from working-class backgrounds called for a return to soviet power
outside of Bolshevik control in the cities. By late 1920 it was becoming clear that some
sort of political confrontation between the regime and its critics was inevitable. The gulf
between Bolshevik rhetoric and the harsh reality of life in the Soviet state was just too
great to ignore. Trotsky was a leading advocate of many reviled practices. Still, he was
not without optimism. At the end of 1920 he declared: “Yes, our country is poor, our
workers’ and peasants’ country is exhausted, but it has the will to fight, to defend its
future, the free family of workers and peasants which will arise and will raise up our
economy, which will make this Moscow and our whole country rich, happy, educated,
and proud that it has shown to all the peoples the road to real freedom and real
brotherhood.”104
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Conclusion: Victory or Retreat?
“The opinion is widespread that the army has completed its historical task and can be
relegated to the archives. There is a widespread urge to leave the army. A communist
considers that he became a soldier, a commissar or a commander only because that was
what was required at the given moment, but what he wants to do now is to build, to
develop a cultured workers’ state. I should like to give warning that this view of the army
as something secondary contains a very dangerous element.”- Lev Trotsky, December
1920105
The decisive defeat of Wrangel’s forces by November 1920 marked the end of
meaningful White opposition in the Russian Civil War. Large parts of Siberia and even
parts of Southern Russia had yet to be fully integrated into the nascent Soviet state, but
all serious military threats had been defeated. Those forces which still opposed the
Bolsheviks by force of arms were more bandits than regular armies in their internal
character. The changing situation left Trotsky in an awkward position. Pressure was
growing in the Bolshevik Party to relegate the Red Army to a position of secondary
importance. The questions on the tips of many party members’ tongues were how to
demobilize the army as quickly as possible and how to reduce the costs of sustaining men
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under arms. At the 9th Party Conference in September 1920, party members directly
attacked the Red Army. Von Hagen detailed the outcry: “Delegates complained that the
constant campaigns to aid the army drained them of resources and that military officials
had no sympathy for their difficulties.”106 Trotsky conceded that it was important to
reduce the expense of maintaining the army, but worried the demobilization might
undermine the Bolsheviks’ defense capabilities. He publicly called for a demobilization
schedule that would reduce the Red Army’s current peak of five-million soldiers by half
as early as spring 1921. Still, he cautioned that the Soviet state was not free of danger,
and said it was therefore foolish to question the Red Army’s relevance.
This did not prevent Trotsky from dedicating a growing amount of his time to
concerns outside of military affairs. He spent much of his energy in the late 1920 and
early 1921 applying the lessons learned in building the Red Army to the economic
sphere. In August 1920 he had pointed to delays in military transport headed for Red
Army units fighting in Poland as a justification for removing the entire leadership of the
railroad union. In their place, Trotsky established Tsektran, a military-like command
structure (with himself at the head) that was responsible for all rail and water transport in
the Soviet state. He had already been acting as Commissar for Transport, but his move to
establish Tsektran put him in more direct control of day-to-day operations of the transport
system.
He claimed the expansion of the methods of the Red Army into transportation was
necessary for efficiency’s sake, but a widespread backlash soon made itself felt. His
political opponents accused him of trying unilaterally to assume operational control of
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another key aspect of the Soviet state. No one was angrier than officials from the unions.
Daniels described the uproar: “At this stage in the evolution of Soviet Communism, such
a regime could not escape bitter criticism for its excesses of bureaucratic centralism. The
criticism was inspired in large measure by principle, especially on the far left.”107 Rather
than retreat, Trotsky brazenly called on the Bolshevik Party to apply his tactics to wider
and wider areas of the economy. He was setting himself up for a political showdown at
the upcoming 10th Party Congress.
Opposition to military-style control of the economy was not limited to party
members. Growing numbers of Soviet civilians, including men recently demobilized
from the army, were violently protesting repressive policies in the economic sphere.
Strikes in the industrial sector were breaking out at an alarming frequency. Brovkin
recorded the rise in strikes: “According to official statistics of the Commissariat of Labor,
during the first six months of 1920 there were strikes in 77 percent of the medium- and
large-size enterprises of Russia.”108 Opposition was even fiercer in the countryside. In
late 1920 a series of revolts broke out in which tens of thousands of peasants took up
arms against the Bolsheviks. Fighting was especially fierce in and around Tambov. There
the party was forced to send in Tukhachevsky and several divisions from the Red Army
to put down the rebels. Pacification of the local population was so difficult, the
Bolsheviks abandoned all semblance of restraint. Brovkin recorded their conduct: “There
was a declaration of war on the entire population. The collection of ‘indemnity’ or the
seizure of ‘bandit family members’ mean in practice the freedom to loot and rape.”109
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The Tambov rebellion was crushed in spring 1921, but only at the cost of tens of
thousands of Bolshevik casualties. The party forfeited any popular support it once had in
the area.
Clearly, Bolshevik policies would have to change if the government was to
prevent a return to the epic violence of the civil war, but Trotsky stubbornly clung to the
coercive economic policies, at least for the time being. Any illusions Trotsky or the party
as a whole might have had about their popularity vanished at Kronstadt. The naval base at
Kronstadt had been a hotbed of radical politics and a bastion of Bolshevik support since
before the October Revolution. At the beginning of the civil war period, Kronstadt sailors
had been dispatched to fight the Bolsheviks’ internal enemies. Much had changed since
the beginning of the Civil War. Bolshevik policies had grown more repressive but the
promised socialist utopia had failed to arise. In 1921, life was much worse for the sailors
of Kronstadt and the working class radicals with whom they affiliated than it had been
before the October Revolution. The men of Kronstadt began to suspect they had been
duped. According to these men, the Revolution had brought to power not the workingclasses, but the intellectuals. In their view, the Soviet state was a dictatorship of the
bureaucracy, not of the proletariat.
The sailors’ growing dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks erupted in early March
1921. Repression of striking workers in nearby Petrograd in late February had led to a
series of meetings amongst the sailors that culminated in the arrest of the leading
Bolshevik functionaries of Kronstadt on 2 March, 1921. The Moscow government issued
an ultimatum calling on the sailors to back down, but the sailors had had enough. They
proclaimed themselves in rebellion against the Soviet state and called on the people to
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rise up in a “third revolution” to overthrow the Bolshevik government. According to the
leaders of the Kronstadt garrison, the Bolsheviks had betrayed the Revolution and also
the interests of the working classes. The historian Israel Getzler summarized the sailors’
pronouncements: “Then with utter disregard of ‘reason and the will of the toilers’, they
who had promised a ‘free kingdom of toil’ and a ‘shining domain of socialism’ instead
created a ‘bureaucratic socialism of slaves’… With ‘bureaucratic trade unions’ which
‘fettered workers to their benches’ and turned labor into a ‘new slavery, rather than a
joy.”110 The Kronstadt sailors had gone from being loyal supporters of the Bolsheviks to
fervent mutineers. They were attacking the party for betraying the very things for which
it claimed to stand. Clearly, the Bolsheviks would have to make some drastic changes if
they were to maintain themselves in power.
The 10th Party Congress opened on 8 March, 1921 in an atmosphere of crisis. The
day before, Mikhail Tukhachevsky had been dispatched to Kronstadt with a force of
60,000 soldiers to put down the rebellion. A vocal faction within the party calling
themselves the “Workers’ Opposition” publicly denounced official party policy. Hunger
in large swathes of Russia had led to full-fledged famine, and thousands were starving.
To rescue the party from these disasters, Lenin proposed a drastic revision in policy. War
communism and the militarization of the economy that Trotsky so vocally championed
would have to be temporarily abandoned in favor of a return to more moderate policies.
In the face of swelling popular unrest, the party would have to restore economic growth
and ease tensions with the population at large. Grain requisitioning would be replaced
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with a tax-in-kind on the peasantry that would allow peasants to keep the bulk of their
produce and sell it on the market. Private enterprise on a small scale would also be
legalized. Lenin’s initiatives represented a direct rebuke of Trotsky’s own plans for the
economy, but, given the desperate circumstances, he rallied a majority of the party to his
side. The result was the New Economic Policy that would govern the Soviet economy for
nearly a decade.
Having proposed a new approach to the economy, Lenin took measures to crush
dissent in the party. Trotsky wholeheartedly supported this “attack on factions”. Leading
Bolsheviks saw a sinister connection between the rise of organized ultra-left dissent in
the party and the leftist rebellion at Kronstadt. To meet the threat, the Central Committee
secured the power to expel party members at will. No party members could run on an
election platform distinct from the official party line. Any public deviation from this line,
or “factionalism”, would be met with a dismissal from the party or worse. The new tone
in party relations was decidedly martial. Daniels described the changes as follows: “1921
reflected the triumph of the Bolshevik organizational doctrine of 1902 over the practice
of 1917--- of military discipline and monolithic unity.”111 Unfortunately for Trotsky, the
party’s intense focus on unity cost him politically. His support for militarization in the
economy and the controversy surrounding his moves at Tsektran were seized upon by his
opponents to undermine him and his followers. The three supporters of Trotsky on the
Secretariat (Yevgeny Preobrazhensky, Nikolai Krestinsky, and Lazar Serebriakov) were
voted out; they also lost their spots on the Central Committee. Supporters of Trotsky
fared similarly poorly in local party committees of importance.
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The one aspect of policy where Trotsky seemed to have his way at the 10th
Congress was military affairs. He had spent much of the winter and spring arguing for a
cautious, gradual approach to the introduction of militia forms. The seriousness of the
Kronstadt revolt and the many peasant revolts bolstered his claims that it was necessary
to maintain a large regular component in the army. Podvoisky’s call for an immediate and
total transformation of the Red Army along the lines of a militia force was decisively
rejected. Similarly a call to “democratize” party life within the army and adopt structures
from the civilian sphere was dismissed. The rejection of militarization within the
economy did not extend to a dismantling of the labor armies, which were left in place by
the 10th Congress. Still, Trotsky’s political victories in the military sphere were
moderated by the issue’s diminishing relative importance.
The 10th Party Congress came to an end at the same time as the last major military
operation of the civil war. 16 March 1921 marked the last day of the Congress and the
beginning of the final assault on Kronstadt. The ice that connected the coastal fortress to
the land would soon melt, and it was therefore necessary to crush the rebellion
immediately, at all costs. After initially relying on regular Red Army troops who
performed poorly, Trotsky realized only soldiers of the most dependable nature could win
at Kronstadt. On his orders, loyal detachments from the Cheka, local party branches, and
officer trainees launched suicidal charge after suicidal charge directly at the walls of the
fort. By the time the Kronstadt rebellion was decisively crushed on 18 March, over
10,000 men and women had died fighting for the Bolsheviks to suppress the revolt. It is a
fitting finale to the tragedy of the Russian Civil War that Trotsky’s Red Army was used
to dispatch sailors who had pledged themselves to the principles of the October
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Revolution. Getzler said of the Bolshevik’s victory: “It certainly made sure that prostate
Kronstadt would not rise again, and that its Soviet democracy would remain but an
unfulfilled promise of the Russian revolution.”112
1921 marked the victory of the Red Army and the Bolshevik state. Trotsky took
pride in having constructed a lethal military force almost from scratch. But the cost of his
success was beyond measure. Millions had died in the civil war, and Russia’s economy
was shattered. The Bolsheviks had lost much of their popular support and were only able
to maintain themselves in power by brute force. Even many of their radical supporters
had long since abandoned the regime, as was so glaringly revealed at Kronstadt. What is
more, by relying on a regular army with a disciplinary code and hierarchical structure
reminiscent of tsarist times, Trotsky had sacrificed ideological purity for the sake of
maintaining power. In the future, the Bolsheviks fell again and again into the trap of
sacrificing their high-minded goals to preserve their hold over Russian society at all
costs. Similar deviations were made during the construction of political institutions in the
1920s and in the rebuilding of the economy under the New Economic Policy. Many new
Party members got their first taste of Soviet life fighting with the Red Army. Trotsky’s
methods were a reminder that the party would do whatever it had to do to preserve
Bolshevik power. The lessons of political centralization and violent coercion first learned
in the civil war were not forgotten in the late 1920s and 1930s, when Stalin sought to
make a “Second October Revolution” in the countryside.
I believe there would have been no Soviet state to remake rural Russia if it had
not been for Trotsky’s role in creating the Red Army. When Trotsky assumed control of
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the army at the beginning of 1918, no one else had both the political capital and the
competence to create an effective fighting force. In February 1918 the nascent Red
defense forces had attempted to resist the advance of Imperial Germany and had been
utterly humiliated. This ugly defeat made it clear that drastic reforms in the army were
needed. Even after the armistice was signed with Germany in 1918, the growing threat of
the Volunteer Army in the south and restiveness among peasants highlighted the
Bolsheviks’ precarious position. In recognition of this fact, the Bolshevik Party entrusted
Trotsky with decisive power to build an army capable of winning a war. Trotsky set
about his task with sufficient courage to defy the party’s ideological orthodoxy.
The result was a Red Army similar to the tsarist army that came before it. Strict
discipline replaced the collegial camaraderie in favor immediately after the October
Revolution. Working-class volunteerism was done away with so that conscription could
provide massive numbers of fresh recruits. Most controversial of all, Trotsky
compensated for the party’s dearth of military expertise by employing former tsarist
officers of non-worker class backgrounds. His lack of hesitation in coercing workers
while simultaneously rewarding “bourgeois” officers enraged many Bolsheviks. To
assuage concerns surrounding the officer corps’ loyalty, Trotsky implemented a system
of dual-command with political commissars in each unit responsible for ensuring loyalty
to the government. The first test for the transformed Red Army came at Kazan in August
1918. The Red forces were victorious.
Trotsky’s use of his vast authority to defy Bolshevik purists led to a political
backlash at the 8th Party Congress in March 1919. He was forced to defend himself
against widespread discontent over his politically questionable methods. Fortunately for
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the Soviet state, he successfully parried these attempts to return to a more “socialist”
form of military organization. The growing White threat of 1919 forced even his foes to
concede the utility of Trotsky’s military program. Even when he suffered political
setbacks in summer 1919, few among his opponents dared to seek an immediate wholesale change in his military policies. Trotsky’s reforms helped the Bolsheviks to defeat
three White armies by the end of the year. Heightened prospects for peace led Trotsky to
attempt to militarize the economy in spring 1920, but war with Poland interrupted his
plans. After the Red Army fought Poland to a stalemate in fall 1920, Trotsky once again
tried to apply Red Army experience to economic reconstruction.
The times had changed. The Bolsheviks’ violence and coercion had alienated
large portions of the citizenry. Raw force was no longer an effective guarantee of
workers’ and peasants’ participation in the economy. By using “tsarist” methods to build
the army, Trotsky had made it more politically palatable to introduce other unorthodox
methods to build the economy. Trotsky had won the war, but could not consummate his
victory. His militarized vision of socialism may have been sensible during the civil war,
but now the Bolsheviks were more concerned with staying in power. If ideals could be
sacrificed to win a war, there was no reason they couldn’t be overlooked in peacetime to
maintain power. Bolshevik supporters who believed October 1917 had signified the
victory of egalitarian beliefs were sorely disappointed: the sailors at Kronstadt had even
revolted against the Soviet regime, only to be crushed by the Red Army. Over the course
of the bloody civil war, Trotsky’s actions had shown that the party would hold nothing
sacred if it threatened their prospects to rule, nothing--- even its own ideals.
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